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Issues and Options for Restructuring 









Until recently the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) was typically vertically integrated 
with a franchise monopoly to be the sole supplier of electricity in each region.  It was, 
with few exceptions, under public ownership, either by the state and/or municipal 
governments. The past decade has seen a dramatic change in views about how the ESI 
should be owned, organised and regulated (Newbery, 1997a; 2000). As a result, there is 
a growing list of experiments in restructuring and reform to study. We are now in a 
better position to reflect on the lessons learned, to identify the most important issues that 
need to be addressed, and the options that should be considered. Perhaps the most 
important lesson is that models which appear to work well in some circumstances and 
places may not be easily transferable to countries facing different circumstances. The 
performance of particular models needs to be interpreted in the light of their special 
circumstances. Choosing the right reform strategy is more challenging than early 
optimists claimed. The experiences of California, South East Asia, and Brazil, have been 
salutary, and underlines the importance of careful analysis of what works, what can go 
wrong, and why. 
 
1.  Pressures for electricity reforms 
 
1.1  The UK electricity reforms and their influence 
The reform and privatisation of the ESI in the UK starting in 1990 demonstrated that it 
was possible to replace state-owned vertically integrated franchise monopolies with 
privately owned, unbundled and regulated successor companies without the lights going 
off. The UK actually offered three models of restructuring to compare and contrast. In 
England and Wales the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was unbundled 
into three generating companies and the grid, thus separating transmission from 
generation. The 12 distribution companies were privatised, and a wholesale market - the 
Electricity Pool - created. Eligible customers above 1 MW were free to buy in the 
wholesale market. Scotland, with its different political, legal and institutional history, 
chose to retain intact the two vertically integrated regional utilities but to privatise them. 
                                                 
1
 Paper commissioned by the World Bank. I am indebted to Yannis Kessides for helpful comments. 
This paper is issued in the CMI series as a contribution to the project “Promoting Productivity by 
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They could both trade in the English Pool, whose prices provided a benchmark for 
regulatory purposes. Northern Ireland, at that time isolated from the mainland and from 
the Republic of Ireland to the south, with a population of only 1.5 million, adopted the 
Single Buyer Model. Distribution and transmission were retained within a franchise 
monopoly, NIE, while the three main generating stations were sold to three separate 
private buyers holding long term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with NIE. 
  Over the next few years, an increasing number of developed and then developing 
countries decided to reform and restructure their ESIs. Norway liberalised without 
changing the ownership structure, but unbundled transmission from generation and 
created a wholesale market and various financial markets. The state of Victoria in 
Australia followed the model of England and Wales, appropriate for an industry based 
almost entirely on coal, as in Britain. Chile had started reforming in the 1980s with a 
cautious programme of tariff rebalancing, legislative reform, the creation of regulatory 
institutions and eventual privatisation. That example was undoubtedly important in 
persuading Argentina that the benefits of reform and privatisation were not confined to 
developed countries. 
  The lessons from Britain and other early reformers were eagerly studied by those 
concerned with the reform process elsewhere. Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Pollitt 
(1997, 1998) have completed social cost-benefit analyses of the three different models 
adopted by the UK, with striking and intuitively plausible results. The restructuring of 
the CEGB immediately introduced daily competitive price bidding for each power 
station. All generating companies dramatically increased productivity and drove down 
costs, including the state-owned Nuclear Electric. The audit of the first five years was 
that the social benefits amounted to a reduction of costs of six per cent for ever 
compared to the counterfactual, equivalent to a 100% return on the sales price. These 
benefits were almost entirely captured by companies, for profits rose as costs fell and 
prices remained stubbornly high until continued and aggressive regulatory intervention 
forced extensive divestment of capacity. By the end of the decade the dominant duopoly 
had evolved into a relative unconcentrated industry. Entrants and incumbents operated 
efficient combined cycle gas turbines, a range of international generating companies 
bought divested plant, and the modern nuclear stations had been privatised. 
  Scotland was a different story. In 1990 electricity prices were 10% lower than in 
England, but the lack of competitive pressure meant that by the end of the decade prices 
were some 5% higher. The very modest benefits of privatisation were entirely absorbed 
by the costs of restructuring, delivering no net benefit. Northern Ireland gives a mixed 
picture. The long-term PPAs provided powerful incentives for increased plant 
availability and cost reductions, so that the improved generator performance outstripped 
that of the CEGB by three times. However, these PPAs retained the benefits with the 
generating companies and consumers were only able to benefit by aggressive price 
reductions on the non-generating elements of cost, combined with Government subsidies 
to reduce the embarrassing price gap between Northern Ireland and Britain.  
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  The lessons from UK electricity restructuring are clear. Increased competitive 
pressure on generation is needed to reduce costs and that requires separating generation 
from transmission and distribution. Whether these benefits will be passed on to 
consumers depends upon the intensity of competition - particularly the number of 
competitors and the existence of an open access wholesale market. Unrestructured 
industries, even if privatised, appear to deliver few benefits. Efficiency improvements in 
transmission and distribution require tough regulatory price controls. Improvements in 
the first five years under the initial price controls were modest, with most of the price 
cuts, efficiency gains, and transfers to consumers confined to the second and subsequent 
regulatory reviews (Domah and Pollitt, 2001). The evidence suggests that regulators 
have to work hard to transfer efficiency gains into lower consumer prices. They also 
need to take positive steps to counteract market power in the potentially competitive 
sectors, possibly including further divestment of capacity, if consumers are to gain from 
restructuring. 
  The lesson that unbundling is necessary has been taken to heart in restructuring 
choices around the world, and particularly in Europe. The European Commission, with 
its mission of creating a single market for goods and services, was anxious to tackle the 
national monopoly electricity industries that allowed very disparate prices for electricity 
to prevail in neighbouring countries. After several years of intense negotiation, the 
Electricity Directive (EC/96/92) came into force on 19 February 1997 to be transcribed 
into national legislation by 19 February 1999. The Directive required functional 
unbundling of generation from transmission (though neither legal nor ownership 
separation), and at least 33% opening of the market, so that eligible customers could 
choose their supplier (see Bergman et al. (1999). 
  It offered three models for the structure of the industry - regulated Third Party 
Access (rTPA), negotiated TPA, or the Single Buyer Model. Under rTPA, the 
transmission company would publish transmission tariffs and access conditions, so that 
generators would be free to transact directly with customers. Under nTPA, generators 
would have to negotiate with the transmission company, which might have ownership 
interests in competing generators. The SBM was consciously designed to mimic the 
effects of rTPA, in that the Single Buyer would buy electricity from generators and sell 
to final consumers, but had to pass on the purchase price with a regulated transmission 
tariff to final consumers. New generation could either be authorised (that is, allowed to 
enter the industry providing that it satisfied planning, license and environmental 
conditions which were to be applied in a transparent and non discriminatory fashion), or 
by tendering, thought to be appropriate to the SBM.  
  The European Commission had been much influenced by the experience of 
liberalisation in the UK, and had so designed the options to make authorization with 
rTPA the natural choice, which was indeed adopted by almost all countries (Bergman, et 
al, 1999). Experience in the few years following the Directive suggested that further 
more pro-competitive steps were required to integrate the electricity market. In March  
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2001 the Commission presented more radical reforms to be incorporated in a proposed 
new Directive. This would require legal separation (though still not full ownership 
separation) of transmission and generation, would insist on rTPA and remove the other 
options. It would require sector regulators (Germany still had none), and complete 
supply liberalisation by 2005. France, who missed the deadline for enacting the earlier 
Directive, and has done the minimal restructuring and market opening, opposed the 
proposals, arguing that it was too soon to deem energy liberalisation a success. Germany, 
with its preference for negotiated TPA and vertical integration, also opposed the 
proposals, particularly the requirement for an independent regulator. Pressure for reform 
from consumers and those countries that have liberalised continues, but for the present 
the reforms are stalled. 
  The emerging European consensus is that unbundling and introducing 
competition has been a success. The main problems have been to create and sustain 
adequate competition, and to prevent market abuses. Prices have fallen almost 
everywhere, although this is largely due to decreasing fuel costs. Even there, electricity 
liberalisation was influential in reforming other energy markets, particularly coal in 
Germany and Britain, and gas the Britain (and more slowly on the Continent). It is, 
however, important to appreciate the favourable circumstances that supported the reform 
process. 
  Britain, and Europe generally, started with substantial excess capacity, itself the 
outcome of the collapse in demand growth after the oil shock of 1974, at a time when a 
large but much delayed investment programme in large coal and nuclear plant was under 
way. Europe had already built up a dense network of transmission capacity, though 
interconnections between countries were less satisfactory. Electrification was complete, 
and the distribution networks needed little investment. Finally, the development of high 
efficiency combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) reached maturity just as Britain was 
liberalising its ESI. The rapid development of gas pipeline systems and the increasing 
availability of cheap gas in Western Europe and the United States provided a fuel at a 
cost that made entry by CCGTs attractive against incumbents. The "dash for gas" in 
Britain resulted in investment in new generation amounting to one-quarter of the existing 
(and perfectly adequate) capacity (as well as virtually eliminating the deep-mined coal 
industry). A cheap new fuel source that stimulated investment and increased competition 
did much to smooth the transition to a market-oriented customer-focused structure. 
  With such favourable circumstances and outcomes, the pressure to replicate the 
early reform example was understandable. The old vertically integrated utility model no 
longer looked like a desirable or even inevitable equilibrium form. Technical progress 
(CCGTs) may have played a small part, but arguably for electricity and gas the 
destabilising force was mature or excess capacity that unsettled the regulatory compact 
(Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). If the utilities had little need for investment to finance 
expensive capacity, then consumer interests saw the merits of pricing closer to avoidable 
costs, letting the market expropriate at least some of the returns to capital. As most of the  
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ESI was in state hands, this expropriation was largely invisible, though in Germany, 
where there were private owners, restructuring was more modest (and has been followed 
by a merger wave and considerable industrial consolidation). 
  In the US, the reform process has been considerably complicated by ensuring that 
stranded assets would be compensated, though initially there was great confidence that a 
new deal could be struck that was beneficial to all parties. With unfortunate timing, just 
when the European Commission was pressing for further reforms, events in California 
shook political confidence in the liberalisation agenda. 
 
1.2  The Californian example 
California originally reformed and liberalised its electricity market because of 
dissatisfaction over high consumer prices. However, average wholesale prices in 2000 
were more than three times those of 1999, and 2001 started with rolling blackouts, stage 
3 alerts,
2 and the major public utility, PG&E, filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
(see Joskow, 2001). California shows that poor market design coupled with 
inappropriate regulatory and political intervention, can rapidly produce extremely 
unsatisfactory outcomes when capacity is tight, particularly if the shortages are 
unexpected. The Californian experience has certainly alarmed European politicians and 
caused several academic energy specialists to reconsider the merits of deregulation. In 
the words of the pseudonymous Price C Watts (2001) "It is clear that deregulation is a 
high-risk choice. Those jurisdictions that have not yet deregulated electricity generation 
need to think long and hard before they go ahead. Those that have done so need to figure 
out how to minimize the downside potential of the journey on which they have 
embarked." 
  What were the various contributory factors to this unhappy outcome? First, 
California (and the neighbouring states) had for a long history of under-investment in 
generation, partly because of disputes over nuclear power plant costs and safety, 
environmental objections, and misconceived long-term Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs) with Qualifying Facilities, QFs, typically owned by "non-utility generators". This 
was sustainable because California imported extensively from the Pacific Northwest, 
making use of the apparently abundant and cheap surplus hydroelectric power from the 
Columbia River. Second, after generation was unbundled from transmission and 
distribution, distribution companies were strongly dissuaded from signing long-term 
contracts for electricity or hedging. This regulatory restraint was caused by the 
California Public Utilities Commission's poor experiences with earlier excessively-
priced PPAs from the QFs. The Commission recognised the spot market price as the 
principal measure of wholesale electricity costs, and utilities were required to trade all 
their power through the Power Exchange (PX).
3  
                                                 
     
2 when reserve margins fall below 1.5% so that disconnection is essential to protect system integrity. 
     
3 In addition, the utilities considered that the contract prices offered were unacceptably expensive,  
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  Finally, NO  emissions were capped by region (and in some cases by plant) on an 
annual basis. In the (not particularly) hot summer of 2000, gas demand for generation 
greatly increased, and pipeline capacity and storage were frequently inadequate to meet 
the demand. Californian gas spot prices more than doubled (coming on top of high 
prices caused by the doubling of crude oil prices), as did the contract prices from many 
QFs, which were indexed to gas prices.
4 The price of tradable NO  permits also rose to 
unprecedented levels as the annual quota became inadequate, with permits trading at 
$80,000/ton at their peak, compared with $400/ton on the East Coast (Laurie, 2001). 
Electricity prices rose, not just in California, but in the whole western interconnection in 
that wholesale power is traded. Thus the average price for the whole year at the Mid-
Columbia hub in the northwest (i.e. not in California) was $137/MWh compared with 
£27/MWh in 1999, higher than in California (where it averaged $91/MWh on the PX). 
California's largest distribution companies were unable to pass on the high wholesale 
prices, precipitating a financial shortfall as revenue fell far short of cost. 
  High plant utilization in the summer and autumn induced by high spot prices 
necessitated greater scheduled maintenance downtime in the normally quieter winter 
period. Unfortunately, the combination of a dry winter in the Columbia River Basin 
lowering hydro output potential, with higher demand due to the colder weather, and 
plant outages in California, caused a severe shortage of capacity and energy, leading to 
higher prices, defaults, and bankruptcy. Inept price caps caused generators to export to 
neighbouring states, rather than sell in California, while the non-utility generators 
refused to supply for fear of not being paid. The repeated interventions of the State 
Governor arguably made a bad situation far worse, as threatened seizures, price caps, 
and regulatory hurdles prejudiced investment in generation. Poorly designed trading 
arrangements, with caps on some markets that encouraged participants to under-contract 
in the day-ahead market and diverted power to the real-time market at very high prices 
amplified market power (Wolak and Nordhaus, 2000). 
  What lessons can be drawn from the Californian experience for electricity 
reform? First, tight electricity markets, where the reserve margin falls below 10%, are 
likely to lead to volatile markets and high prices even if they are fairly competitive 
(meaning that there are four or more generating companies competing with each other at 
the margin of supply).
5  As demand tightens relative to supply, inelastic and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
compared to past experience, and were thus unenthusiastic about hedging. In the event the contract 
prices would have been extremely cheap compared to the subsequent spot prices. 
     
4 By the end of 2000 gas prices had risen to $15/MMBtu compared to a historic average of 
$2/MMBTu, and December electricity prices were estimated to be three times higher as a result. On one 
occasion after an accident disrupting deliveries on one of the major pipelines, spot gas reached 
$61/MMBTU, equivalent to an fuel cost in a reasonably efficient generator of $610/MWh (Bogorad and 
Penn, 2001). 
     
5 There are problems in using standard tests for market concentration, such as the HHI for either 
capacity or output, for what matters is the extent of competition between generators with bids near the  
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unresponsive demand
6 means that large price rises have little effect on demand, but each 
supplier has increasing and eventually very considerable market power. The large 
increase in price caused by any single company withdrawing a small amount of capacity 
is more than sufficient to compensate for the loss of profit on that volume of sales, 
making such withdrawals highly profitable in tight markets. 
  Second, any transition from a vertically integrated utility to an unbundled 
structure introduces price risks between generators and suppliers that previously 
cancelled out. High wholesale selling prices for generators gives profits upstream that 
are matched by the losses of downstream suppliers who have to buy at these high 
wholesale prices and sell at predetermined retail prices, unless these purchases are 
hedged by contracts. The transition to (and subsequent operation of) an unbundled 
industry therefore needs contracts and hedging instruments to insure against possible 
unexpected events that can have dramatic effects on spot prices, particularly when 
suppliers sell on fixed price terms. The British privatisation was accompanied by three-
year contracts for both sale of electricity and purchase of fuel to reduce transitional risks. 
  Third, in an interconnected system operating under a variety of different 
regulatory and operational jurisdictions, spare capacity is a public good that may not be 
adequately supplied unless some care is taken to ensure that it is adequately 
remunerated. Fourth, it is even harder for a decentralised market under multiple 
jurisdictions to ensure adequate reserve capacity with a potentially energy-constrained 
hydroelectric system, particularly where reservoir storage is limited, and annual water 
volume variations are high. Finally, uncoordinated and injudicious regulatory 
interventions in such an interconnected system can have perverse local effects, and very 
damaging impacts on the efficient pattern of inter-regional electricity trade (Wolak and 
Nordhaus, 2000; 2001). 
 
1.3  Pressures for reform in developing countries 
Pressure for change in mature industrial economies grew with the emergence of excess 
capacity and the disillusionment with expensive and capital-intensive generation projects 
precipitated by the oil crisis of the 1970s. The circumstances in developing countries 
differ in important respects. Most countries have had very high rates of demand growth 
for electricity, at least in periods when their economies were expanding. Whereas 
investment needs were low in mature countries with excess capacity, they are high in 
many developing countries. Many countries have no spare capacity and excess demand, 
often with periodic blackouts. Market clearing prices in such cases would be politically 
unacceptable, and would likely derail any attempts at radical liberalisation. Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
market clearing price. 
     
6  If consumers face prices unrelated to spot wholesale prices they will not reduce demand even if 
wholesale prices increase dramatically. All domestic and most commercial and industrial customers are 
in this position.  
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advanced industrial economies have developed commercial law and institutions to the 
point that private ownership of natural monopolies can be regulated in the interests of 
consumers while protecting the ability of the owners to finance investment. The ESI is 
capital-intensive, its assets are long-lived, and once invested cannot be relocated for use 
elsewhere.  Electricity is a necessity and in urban areas at least an overwhelming share of 
the political constituency are directly dependent on the monopoly supplier, ensuring that 
regulated or government-set prices are politically inevitable. 
  The political demands for access and `fair' or non-exploitative prices means that 
investors must expect that after they have sunk their capital they will be limited in the 
prices they can charge, and subject to possibly onerous obligations to supply, to 
guarantee security, stability and safety.  If these investors are to be induced to invest, 
they need the reassurance that future prices will be set at a sufficiently remunerative 
level to justify the investment.  Once the capital has been sunk, the risk is that the 
balance of advantage would shift towards those arguing for lower and possibly 
unremunerative prices.  Durable investments thus require the rule of law, and 
specifically the law of property, to protect owners, while network utilities, providing a 
public essential service, need the additional protection of fair and credible regulation to 
protect investments.  In their absence, public ownership is the logical default option, and 
one that was widely adopted. 
  The post-war governments in most developing countries had been convinced of 
several things - electricity was vital to economic development, the ESI was a paradigm 
of the tightly centrally-planned successful socialist enterprise, the large investment 
required to increase penetration demanded the resources of the state, and the World 
Bank could be relied upon to provide the investment funds and the technical expertise to 
equip countries with state-of-the-art western technology. The standard model of a 
vertically integrated, state-owned, centrally planned ESI was therefore replicated 
throughout the developing world. 
  In the early days of rapid growth and young plant, prices could be set at cost 
recovering levels and even allowed to fall with the rapidly decreasing costs as 
economies of scale and new technology were exploited. Over time, and especially as 
inflationary and budgetary pressures increased, the margin between revenue and costs 
was squeezed, maintenance was delayed, management deteriorated, and over-manning 
through political patronage increased. Under-pricing to favoured groups in rural areas 
became politically more salient and more difficult to reverse, while theft and losses in 
urban areas further undermined the financial viability of the sector. The sector was in 
crisis, though for different reasons than those experienced in developed countries. 
 
2.  Systemic problems of state ownership 
 
The public sector appears to find managing state-owned capital-intensive utilities 
difficult, and not just in developing countries. Part of the problem is that operating costs  
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(mainly fuel) are only about half total costs, so that utilities can underprice while still 
covering operating costs. Managers and politicians alike have a shared interest in under-
pricing to stimulate demand and secure political support. Excess demand signals the 
need for investment, which managers desire, and which politicians take as a sign of 
development. Maintenance has less appeal, because poor performance and worn-out 
plant underwrites the need for new investment. If plant breaks down, employment to 
maintain and keep the plant struggling on can be defended, and power companies are 
often remarkably overmanned as a result. The costs of overmanning appear modest 
relative to the fuel and capital costs, so there is little pressure to reduce staff, but 
overmanning tends to lead to inadequate salary levels, making it harder to recruit 
competent staff who could manage maintenance and operations more efficiently. 
  International agencies were happy to fund power sector investment as they were a 
visible sign of a successful transfer of technology, and obviously had high social returns. 
The cost of unserved power, even in poor countries, is high and can be plausibly 
quantified. Covenants on tariffs could be agreed, only to be abandoned as inflationary 
pressures were addressed by holding down public sector prices. The result was that over 
time real electricity prices declined as did profits (and hence the ability to self-finance 
investment). This was becoming increasingly evident by the 1990s, and a survey of 360 
companies in 57 World Bank countries in 1989 found that the rate of return on revalued 
net fixed assets had declined to below 4% (World Bank, 1993), well below the 10% rate 
of return normally taken as the test discount rate by international agencies.  Only 60% of 
power sector costs were covered by revenue (Besant-Jones, 1993), while self-financing 
ratios fell to only 12% of investment requirements in 1991 (World Bank, 1993, p12).
7  
Newbery (1993) noted similar problems for Asian countries.  Underpricing electricity 
resulted in a heavy fiscal burden estimated at $90 billion annually or about 7% of total 
government revenues in developing countries, larger than annual power investment 
requirements of about $80 billion, while technical inefficiencies caused true economic 
losses of nearly $30 billion annually (World Bank, 1994, table 6.7). 
  Several decades of studies of tariff reforms, covenants to improve pricing, and 
reports arguing that underpricing electricity was inefficient, fiscally harmful and 
distributionally unjust, appeared to have no effect. Without an alternative source of 
investment, aid agencies could be blackmailed into continued support, and the soft 
budget constraint reduced incentives to take politically unpopular pricing decisions. 
When first Chile, then Britain, followed rapidly by other countries, demonstrated that 
privatisation worked, it seemed like the obvious answer to the problem - how to instill 
                                                 
     
7  The power sector would be able to finance all investment at an unchanged gearing ratio if the 
financial rate of return exceeded the rate of growth of capacity.  The average annual rate of growth of 
power was about 7% p.a. for middle income countries between 1960-90, compared to an average 
economic (but not financial) rate of return on World Bank projects of 11%  (World Bank, 1994, fig. 3 
and table 1.2).  Had the financial rate of return been raised to the economic rate of return, financing 
should not have been a problem.  
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financial prudence, management competence, and operational efficiency into the 
industry and at the same time relieve the government of the heavy investment costs. 
 
2.1  Possible solutions to the problem 
Power shortages are caused by inadequate investment and inefficient operation. The two 
requirements of providing incentives for efficiency and a mechanism for adequate 
investment are both satisfied in normal competitive markets with private ownership. 
Private owners pursue profit. They have every incentive to ensure that customers pay 
their bills or face disconnection.  If firms have little influence over the market price, then 
the only way they can increase profit is to cut costs. Competition thus provides the spur 
to efficiency and solvency. Second, when more capacity is required, prices in 
competitive markets will rise to the marginal cost of expansion (including the return on 
investment). These prices will allow firms either to finance investment out of retained 
profits or to borrow against future profits. Private ownership provides motive, and 
competition provides the incentive for efficient pricing and investment. For that and 
other reasons, competitive enterprises should be placed in the private sector. 
  The obvious problem with the ESI is that the transmission and distribution 
businesses are natural monopolies and cannot be operated as competitive undertakings. 
The logical solution is to separate the potentially competitive generation and supply (or 
retailing) from the core natural monopoly networks. Generation and supply might then 
operate on competitive markets, and the natural monopoly would be regulated in a way 
that imitates the effect of competition. The regulated prices would be set at a level that 
enables the owner to finance operation and investment while providing incentives for 
efficiency. If the generation market is to be adequately competitive, then the 
transmission owner must have no ownership interests in any generation company, to 
prevent him favouring some generators over others. 
  The crucial restructuring question is how best to introduce competition into 
generation (and supply). The standard answer to date is that competition requires a 
market, and generation will therefore need a wholesale electricity market, either 
organised as a power exchange or Pool. That model has worked well when there is 
adequate capacity in generation, sufficiently numerous independent generating 
companies, and sufficient transmission capacity to ensure that each generator faces many 
competitors at all times. These conditions are very demanding, and may not easily be 
sustainable. Although many electricity industries have been restructured successfully, 
they all started with substantial spare capacity. As time passes, if prices remain low 
because of sufficiently strong competition, then entry will be unattractive and capacity 
will become scarce. In addition, incumbents are likely to wish to merge to increase their 
market power, and to act to deter entry by various means. One should therefore be rather 
cautious about the applicability of this solution. It may be sustainable where there is 
sophisticated regulation of competition, and where regulators can find a way of ensuring 
"over-investment" in transmission, to maximise the extent of the market (beyond that  
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needed in a tight power pool under central dispatch). California reminds us that 
sophisticated regulation is a scarce commodity even in advanced countries. 
 
2.2  Reform experience in developing countries 
What may be termed the standard reform model for the ESI is one in which the 
potentially competitive parts are separated from the core natural monopoly transmission 
and distribution, with a regulatory agency setting the transmission and distribution 
tariffs. Competing generators offer electricity to the wholesale market, eligible 
customers are free to choose their supplier, and new entrants are free to build new 
capacity with non-discriminatory access to the grid and final customers. By that 
standard, in the developing world Latin America is not only where the first reforms 
started (in Chile), but where the standard model has been most influential and most 
widely adopted. How well has it worked? 
  According to Izaguirre and Rao (2000), in the period from 1990-9 Latin America 
took $77 billion out of a total of $193 billion of private electricity projects in developing 
countries. The ranking of countries in terms of private investment per capita very much 
follows the order of private sector involvement, with Chile leading, followed by 
Argentina, then Brazil, Panama, Columbia and other Central American countries. 
Chile’s progress has been of enormous significance in demonstrating the feasibility of 
private sector involvement in the ESI of developing countries, and has provided lessons 
for subsequent reforms. Its progress was sensibly cautious, with restructuring and 
legislation introduced in 1982 and privatisation not starting until 1986. Given the 
obvious fears of expropriation by private investors, Chile had to create confidence by 
carefully identifying the rights of the investors in primary legislation that would be 
difficult to change. This had the advantage of creating shareholder confidence, but the 
disadvantage of creating a very inflexible structure that was ill-adapted to addressing 
problems of market abuse.  
 
2.2.1  The experience in Chile 
After the new electricity law was passed in 1982, the two state-owned integrated 
companies, ENDESA and Chilectra, were divided into separate generation and local 
distribution companies - thus ENDESA was divided into five separate generating 
companies and eight distribution companies.  However, the interconnected transmission 
system was placed under ENDESA's umbrella, giving that generating company 
potentially preferential access, and storing up problems for the future. 
  The restructured companies were subsequently privatised and by 1991 there were 
11 power generating companies, 21 electricity distribution companies and two integrated 
companies.  Galal (1994) presents a social cost-benefit analysis of the privatization of 
Chilgener, one of a number of competing generators, and Enersis, a monopoly 
distribution company, both created out of Chilectra. Chilgener increased its profit, 
investment and productivity after divestiture.  The increase in profit was due to a move  
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to marginal cost pricing and increased capacity utilization, both due to improved 
regulation rather than divestiture.  Galal's base estimate shows that the present 
discounted value of the simple sum of gains was Ch$4 billion, 21% of the private value 
of Chilgener.  Of this Ch$4b, Ch$2.7b went to foreign shareholders, Ch$3.8b went to 
domestic shareholders, Ch$0.1b to employees, zero (ie no change) to consumers, and 
-Ch$2.7b (ie a loss) to the Government. 
  Enersis, unlike Chilgener, is not subject to competition, and its external 
regulatory regime did not change with privatization.  Nevertheless, privatization 
encouraged the company to reduce losses from theft and improve returns on non-
operating assets.  The gainers were shareholders (Ch$42.9b, of which foreign 
shareholders received Ch$2.2b), and honest customers (Ch$17.5b), while the losers were 
non-paying consumers (Ch$9.8b), the Government (Ch$5.6b), and Chilean citizens 
(Ch$26.3b), who lost the opportunity to receive the shareholder gains in ENDESA (had 
they remained publicly owned) which were instead captured by Enersis and passed to its 
own shareholders.  The net benefit to Chile was Ch$16.3b, and to foreigners Ch$2.2b, or 
together 31% of the private value of Enersis.  Privatization was again costly to the 
Government, resulted in considerable redistributions (some desirable, from non-paying 
to paying customers), but more of the gains were captured domestically than in the case 
of Chilgener. 
  The sequencing of reform in Chile is instructive in that the reform of the 
regulatory system and the restructuring of state enterprises occurred first, to ensure that 
the new enterprises had some experience of the regulatory regime before privatisation.  
Privatisation proceeded slowly, avoiding some of the risks of underpricing with 
attendant larger transfers to shareholders, while wide share ownership created political 
support for the new system. 
  The benefits of restructuring and price regulation are that prices now reflect 
economic costs, being regionally differentiated and related to SRMC, as efficiency 
requires.  In addition, although prices are close to marginal costs, the companies have 
made reasonable profits, and have been willing to invest in new hydro capacity as well 
as in transmission and distribution (Spiller, 1996).  The worries lie largely on the degree 
of competition in the system, which will affect the costs used to set the prices.  ENDESA 
has been strongly criticised for its monopoly over transmission, which allowed it to limit 
access by other generators.  These generators also disputed the pricing of transmission.  
ENDESA also has dominance over current generation capacity (over 50% in the central 
system) and over access to water rights for future hydro power (over 40% of 
economically viable water).  New generation plant has been small scale, built when 
needed rather than reaping economies of larger scale, suggesting that ENDESA may not 
be subject to much competitive pressure. 
  If Chile failed to deal adequately with competition concerns, it did place some 
constraints on the ability of generators to exploit their market power. The regulated part 
of the wholesale market relates the wholesale price to audited costs. The drawback is  
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that this has led to endless arguments about the measurement of these costs. Similarly, 
Chile’s innovative attempt to regulate distribution companies on the basis of a 
hypothetical model distribution company provided strong incentives for efficiency 
improvements, but was relatively ineffective at passing these cost reductions through to 
final consumers. Between 1987 and 1998 wholesale prices fell by 37% but final prices 
fell by only 17%. The rate of return of the main distribution company rose from 10% to 
35% over this period (Fischer and Serra, 2000). 
 
2.2.2 Argentina's  reforms 
The next major reform was in Argentina, which learned much from Chile's mistakes. 
Reforms starting in 1992 transformed the structure, ownership and regulation of the ESI 
(Perez-Arriaga, 1994).  Argentina had a population of 34 million, generation capacity of 
16,000 MW, and consumption of 51 TWh (1994), though capacity availability was 
initially very low (at 45%).  The generation mix was fairly balanced, with 44% hydro, 
45% thermal and 11% nuclear.  As in England, restructuring unbundled the industry into 
generation, transmission, and distribution.  Distribution is regulated as a natural 
monopoly and the generating companies were so divided that no generator had more 
than 10% of capacity initially.  By the end of 1993 there were 70 firms trading in the 
bulk supply market.  By 1997 there were 40 generating companies, most of were by then 
private, and over 20 distribution companies, many of them provincial.  The national grid 
and the three federal distribution companies were privatised, as were about half the 
provincial distribution companies. 
  The wholesale electricity market determines prices on the basis of bids that can 
only be changed every six months - reflecting a move away from the audited cost 
approach of Chile, but not to the daily bidding of the English Pool. The theory is that a 
bid that must remain valid for a longer period is less likely to be used to manipulate the 
market to take advantage of short-term opportunities (curiously, the 2001 reforms to 
Trading Arrangements in Britain have moved in the other direction from daily to half-
hourly bidding). 
  The reforms had a very positive effect on plant availability (which increased from 
45% to 72%) and power outages, while the pool prices are giving market signals not 
only for investment in generation but also in transmission.  The monthly average price in 
the wholesale electricity market fell from about $45/MWh (with peaks over $70/MWh) 
steadily down to about $15/MWh in 1997. (The 1998 average was $24/MWh, in 1999, 
$26/MWh, and in 2000, just over $27/MWh, since when it has drifted back to about 
$25/MWh annual average.)
8  Despite the fall in prices, 4,927 MW net additional 
capacity was added to the system, while available capacity increased from 5,930 MW in 
1992 to 13,530 MW in December 1997. More than half of the new capacity was hydro-
electric (all commissioned before the reforms), though the trend demand for gas has 
                                                 
     
8 Updates can be downloaded from http:/www.cammesa.com.ar  
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almost doubled over the period. CCGT increased from 144 MW in 1996 to 5011 MW in 
2001, up to 23% of gross installed capacity in the main system (MEM). The availability 
of abundant cheap gas, as in Britain, greatly assisted the transformation of the electricity 
sector. 
  The wholesale electricity market appeared to be operating extremely 
competitively, though there were criticisms that regulatory constraints, methods of 
calculating prices, and price caps interfered with efficient functioning of the markets. 
Specifically, the capacity payments, set at $10/MW, did not reflect opportunity costs, 
and the system of smoothing prices for distribution companies discouraged them from 
contracting.  The regulated prices failed to reflect costs. It would have been preferable to 
allow prices to track costs moment by moment, even though the underlying prices would 
be more volatile, and to encourage distribution companies to buy on contract to hedge 
these risks, rather than discouraging them by not allowing them to pass through any 
contract costs to final customers. The California experience suggests that it is most 
important to encourage contracting with distribution companies, mainly to alleviate 
problems of market power (that were not so important in Argentina), but also to signal 
the need for and willingness to pay for adequate capacity. 
 
2.2.3 Colombia 
Colombia, coming later, was more ambitious in reforming the wholesale market, and 
more closely followed the English Pool model. The reforms suffered from the delayed 
and incomplete privatisation of the distribution companies. They were under municipal 
ownership or de facto control, creating local patronage that was hard to oppose. They 
remained inefficient, overstaffed, corrupt, and with poor collection and high theft. The 
generators would not sign contracts with the clearly uncredit-worthy distribution 
companies, and the Power Pool was similarly unable to collect payment. When the Pool 
cut off major cities, the population blockaded highways until the Superintendent of 
Public Services forced the Pool to restore service (Millan, Lora and Micco, 2001), 
risking bankruptcy. 
  While the distribution experiences were unsatisfactory, the reform of generation 
also left much to be desired, as it repeated the British mistake of not creating adequate 
competition in the wholesale market. The 3-firm concentration ratio (i.e. the market 
share of the three largest firms) in Argentina is only 30%, but in Colombia and Chile is 
50% (and substantially higher in most smaller countries). As a result, market power has 
been a continuing problem in many Latin and Central American countries. 
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2.2.4 Brazil 
Brazil, like California, faces an electricity crisis, and like California, raises awkward 
questions and points to the cost of flawed and inappropriate reforms. Rather than repeat 
the full details of reform in the largest Latin American country, this brief account will 
just highlight some of the lessons that can be drawn from the attempt at reform. In 
common with many developing countries, the main argument for reform was to 
overcome problems of under-investment and the fiscal burden of financially poorly 
performing companies. Despite continuing rapid growth in demand, investment peaked 
at about $12 billion per year in 1982 (and again briefly in 1987) before declining steadily 
to $3 billion by 1999 (de Araujo, 2001). The reforms, started in 1990, were given more 
momentum by the Cardoso administration from 1994, and were heavily influenced by 
the English model of unbundling, competition and privatisation (with the possible 
exception of transmission). 
  The distinctive feature of Brazil that contrasts sharply with Britain is that it is 
dominantly (95%) hydro-based with large multi-year storage dams, and relatively recent 
access to gas, with an immature gas network and market. In contrast to almost all other 
countries, the long-run marginal cost of additional hydro investment is probably lower 
than that of CCGT. In addition, dispatching the dams gains considerably from basin-
wide coordination (allowing perhaps an additional 20% firm power), while considerable 
rainfall fluctuations mean that it is advisable to maintain adequate water reserves, or 
face, as at present, severe and long-duration shortages when rains fail and dams have 
been depleted. Finally, the dams are multi-use, and managing them for irrigation and 
other water uses requires close coordination between the water management authorities 
and power dispatch. 
  These conditions are the least propitious for a competitive, privately owned 
generation market. Investing in multi-use hydro-electric projects that need coordinated 
regulation creates considerable private investor risk. Dams are entirely front-end loaded, 
with negligible running costs but massive investment costs. The gains from private 
operation (once built) are thus likely to be small, and the risks that prices will be held 
down in periods of tight demand high, while if water is spilled, prices may fall almost to 
zero in a competitive market. Investing in CCGT is equally unattractive, for although 
from a least-cost system expansion view point, some low capital cost flexible plant may 
be desirable, the financial economics look terrible. It would only operate in drought 
years, and the overall load factor would probably be less than 35%. Its average cost 
would exceed the LRMC of hydro, and if hydro prices are suppressed in periods of 
shortage, then the average price will be even lower, and hence unremunerative without 
special payments for its role as emergency capacity or reserve. 
  The uncomfortable conclusion is that it is unlikely that private ownership of 
generation is an efficient way to plan, develop and finance the generation sector in 
Brazil. It is an open question whether it would ever be in countries requiring large-scale 
multi-use river basis management schemes. The most favourable circumstances would  
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be for dams whose sole use is for hydro-electricity, and where the price of electricity is 
set by thermal plant, as in Chile and Argentina. Private involvement in generation has a 
comparative advantage where timely construction and maintenance are required to 
deliver possible efficiency benefits, but is least likely to work in dominantly hydro 
systems. 
  In the past, Electrabras (the largest state owned generator) has, with considerable 
financial support from the international financial institutions (IFIs), been able to 
mobilise the required funds to finance hydro investment. Given the remit to plan a 
coordinated programme of transmission and generation investment, and the financial 
autonomy to undertake it, subject to proper regulation and audit, one would expect a 
competent and well-managed company to be able to finance and undertake such an 
investment programme. The main risk, which may be hard to protect against, is that the 
state or provincial government may be attracted by the large rents accruing to hydro 
systems, to transfer the funds for other uses - public finance, cheap electricity, patronage, 
etc. Highly capital-intensive industries like hydro-electric generation and long-distance 
transmission lines are vulnerable to such expropriation in periods of inflation or 
downturns in forecast demand, when the pressure to finance investment declines for a 
period.  Putting in place the kind of indexed return on an inflation-revalued asset base 
requires a degree of regulatory sophistication that has only emerged gradually under the 
English system of RPI-X regulation of network utilities. 
 
2.3  Addressing the systemic problems 
What advice can we give to a country whose ESI is still in state ownership, and where 
there is genuine political commitment to reform?  The first question to address is 
whether there is a logical sequence of reforms, and whether it is costly to undertake 
reforms in the wrong order.  It is a good principle that any reform addresses the most 
important problems first, and that the early reforms should if possible create a 
momentum for future desirable reforms, while minimising the risks of failure and policy 
reversal.  Reversible and less risky reforms can be undertaken more readily than 
irreversible (or costly to reverse) and more risky reforms.  Some irreversible reforms 
may be necessary to commit the country to future desirable changes, and privatisation is 
often argued to be one such reform.  Nevertheless, the principle that irreversible reforms 
require more careful design and assessment than reversible reforms holds good. 
  Fortunately there is growing evidence on what constitute robust, self-sustaining 
and desirable reform strategies, and what strategies are risky and may lead to undesirable 
outcomes. Privatisation itself is only reversible at high external cost (loss of reputation 
for foreign investment).  Imperfectly designed privatisation can complicate subsequent 
reforms. Similarly, it is often hard or costly to reverse structural choices, such as the 
degree of vertical and horizontal integration. 
 
2.3.1  Privatising and regulating distribution  
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The diagnosis presented earlier is that the current system of ownership, management and 
finance leads to unbalanced tariffs, unremunerative prices, often associated with a failure 
to collect bills or reduce theft, excessive costs, and hence an inability to sustain efficient 
investment.  The logical place to break this vicious circle is with the key mechanism that 
sustains non-cost reflective tariffs - the distribution and supply end (usually combined) 
that collects revenue from final consumers. The best way to both start and sustain this 
reform is to separate the network monopoly of distribution from the rest of the ESI, 
privatise it, and subject it to price or revenue cap regulation. 
  There is a related question about whether to separate out the supply (or retailing) 
function from distribution, or at least to signal that this will take place in due course, as 
part of the larger programme of separating competitive from monopoly segments. This 
partly depends on whether it is expected that a supply franchise for smaller customers 
(perhaps all those taking less than 1 MW or possible 100kW) will continue. For various 
reasons discussed below, the case for full supply liberalisation is probably weak even in 
developed countries, and arguably even weaker in developing countries. If so, then the 
natural supplier to the franchise market is the distribution company, and the main 
requirement is to ensure that other suppliers to eligible customers have non-
discriminatory access to the distribution network and meters. It would be sensible for 
this requirement to be written into the electricity legislation. 
  Privatisation is not feasible without a commitment to cost-reflective tariffs, which 
needs effective and independent regulation to be credible. On the principle of delaying 
irreversible reforms until the conditions are right, the government should state its 
intention to privatise as soon as the regulatory institutions command the necessary 
private sector confidence. That confidence will only be forthcoming if the government 
(and likely successor governments) are seen to be strongly committed to reform. If there 
is any doubt, then investors will be rightly cautious. There are many ways in which 
interest groups can derail or undermine reforms. Unless everyone believes that the 
government will be able to effectively over-rule or discipline these opponents, then 
privatisation will seem very risky. This will either make the distribution companies 
unsaleable, or only at such a low price that any subsequent profits will seem unjustified. 
In such cases it would be better to wait until there is credible commitment to reform. 
Testing private sector support is relatively straightforward - investment bankers will be 
able to assess whether they consider that a flotation would be successful at an acceptable 
price.  
 
    18 
  The obvious difficulty is that if privatisation is unattractive to politically powerful 
groups, then their best strategy is to derail the creation of regulatory institutions. 
Knowing this, the government has various options, none of which are very attractive, 
and some of which are definitely high risk. One strategy is to press on with privatisation 
and setting up regulation in parallel, perhaps putting in place strong contractual 
commitments to the distribution companies that will run until the regulator is fully 
operational and effective. A variant of this is to choose other governance structures short 
of full privatisation, such as management contracts, or limited-term renewable 
concessions with carefully designed contracts. The experience of management contracts 
is not encouraging - they were tried 
and abandoned in Orissa (see Box 
1). 
  In Chile, privatising 
distribution solved the problem of 
theft, as noted above. In Colombia, 
continued municipal ownership or 
control which failed to address 
problems of low collection derailed 
much of the rest of the reform, 
showing how critical it is to address 
the retailing stage before attempting 
the remaining reforms. However, 
high theft and losses create another 
difficulty with privatisation and 
regulation, and that is to determine 
the extent to which the new owner is 
to bear the risk of eliminating or 
failing to eliminate theft and 
corruption. 
 Again,  Orissa  provides 
salutary lessons. After the failure of 
the management contracts (Box 1), 
the Government of Orissa invited competitive tenders to strategic investors for 51% of 
the shares of each of the four distribution companies in late 1997, with 49% remaining 
with Gridco, the transmission company, under state ownership. Bids were submitted in 
the second half of 1998, and after a certain amount of negotiation, three discos were 
awarded to BSES in April 1999 and the fourth, Cesco, was awarded to AES Corp (USA) 
in September 1999. These investors paid a premium of 40% over the revalued book 
value of the assets. 
  The regulator, OERC, holds open annual tariff hearings that result in revisions to 
the bulk supply tariff (BST) and to the tariffs set by the discos. There were tariff orders 
The first Indian State to start reforming was Orissa 
in 1993, with 2,900 MW of generation supplying 1.3 
million consumers, of whom less than half were 
metered. Losses exceeded 50%. The Orissa 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (OERC) was 
created in 1995, and the Orissa Electricity Reform 
Act came into force in April 1996. The Act 
unbundled the State Electricity Board, and 
eventually created four distribution companies. The 
first was initially operated under a management 
contract or Distribution Operations Agreement, 
awarded to the Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply 
Company (BSES) in October 1996. It was revoked 
in April 1997 when it became clear that 
corporatisation under a management contract had 
not worked. Part of the problem was that the 
employees remained with Gridco, the State-owned 
transmission company, and management continued 
to be subject to continued political interference. It 
became clear that the more radical reform of 
privatising the distribution companies was required. 
That step was completed in 1999. 
  Box 1 Management contracts in India  
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in March 1997, November, 1998 and December 1999 (the first after privatisation). One 
of the key issues in setting the tariffs is the level of losses that is assumed in determining 
the revenue requirements of the companies, and this has been gradually forced down to 
provide incentives for the companies to reduce losses. 
  The experience of these early tariff revisions has been mixed. OERC has insisted 
on keeping uniform tariffs across the state despite differences in costs, and has 
differentiated the BST charged to each disco to compensate. OERC kept down the 
lifeline tariff (on the first 100kWh/month) after the 1998 cyclone, and denied interest 
payments on bonds raised to securitise payables and raise working capital. In the words 
of the Frontier Economics report, this totally undermined the financial recovery plan 
which had been recently prepared for Gridco. (Frontier Economics, 2000, 1.2.1). 
  Subsequent developments were not encouraging. Gridco still owns 49% of the 
distribution companies, and is itself effectively bankrupt. The regulator (and perhaps the 
companies) made over-optimistic estimates of how rapidly theft and losses could be 
controlled, so that the distribution companies failed to achieve the target allowed 
revenue. On July 18, 2001, AES filed arbitration proceedings in the Orissa High Court, 
claiming that Gridco owed Cesco $45 million, and threatened to sell out and quit the 
country. 
  Clearly, it is difficult to devise a sensible regulation system for the transition from 
a corrupt, theft-prone and loss-making distribution company to a viable privately owned 
and efficiently operated company. If the regulator is too optimistic in assuming that 
losses will decline, then the distribution company is likely to refuse to pay the generating 
company (or single buyer, as would frequently be the case, and was in Orissa). If, on the 
other hand, the company is allowed to pass on any losses in reduced payments, there 
would be little incentive to reduce losses. If they are allowed to keep all or most of the 
revenue previously stolen or not collected, their profits may reach unacceptable levels - 
as has been the one of the main criticisms in Chile. How this might be done is discussed 
below in the section dealing with tariff regulation. 
 
2.3.2 Regulating  distribution 
Satisfactory regulatory institutions need to be in existence and to have the confidence of 
the private sector for successful privatisation.  Private ownership requires a credible and 
effective system of regulation if potential owners are to be willing to pay fair market 
value for the assets and are to be persuaded to invest efficiently.  Price-cap regulation 
provides superior incentives for efficiency, but requires periodic resetting if the 
efficiency gains are to be passed through to consumers. It may also need to be reset at 
the request of the utility if it is not able to finance needed investment. 
  Buyers need to know how the price-cap will be reset at subsequent periodic 
reviews if they are to properly value the company, so this will also need to be set out in 
the legislation or the licence or concession contracts with the operators.  Given the high 
stakes involved in resetting prices, which transfer rents from one side of the market to  
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the other, a satisfactory dispute resolution procedure is also required and needs to be 
specified clearly in advance of privatisation. Finally, price-cap regulation provides 
strong incentives for cost-cutting. To prevent cost-cutting lowering the quality of supply, 
minimum quality standards will need to be set, with penalties for failure (payable to 
those suffering the poor quality). 
  Price-cap regulation is more demanding than traditional cost-of-service or rate-
of-return regulation, where the procedure for rate-setting can be more carefully codified, 
leaving less discretion to the regulator, and hence providing more assurance to the 
utility. However, rate-of-return regulation runs into the problem that the rate of return 
required by an investor in a developing country with a poorly developed capital market 
may be politically unacceptable. Certainly some investors have preferred properly 
indexed price caps precisely because they conceal from public discussion the likely rate 
of return. This problem is only temporarily avoided by price-cap regulation, because 
when it comes to resetting the price caps, the return on the asset base is needed to 
determine the allowed price. The asset base must be indexed, uprated by new 
investment, and then the required rate of return to elicit future finance determined before 
prices can be reset. Typically the required rate of return is public information, and will 
be subject to critical scrutiny. 
  The requirement to set in place proper regulation is now widely recognised as 
necessary, and its absence from the legislation, licences and rules under which the 
various institutions operate will be clearly signalled by bankers, financial advisors and 
consultants.  Let us suppose for the moment that privatisation of distribution looks 
promising, and probe more deeply into the details and problems of setting the tariffs. 
 
2.3.3  Setting cost-reflective tariffs 
The first step is to identify the efficient costs of distribution (and similar principles apply 
to transmission). These will include interest on and depreciation of the asset value (or 
Regulatory Asset Base, RAB - see Newbery, 1997b), as well as the efficient level of 
operating costs and distribution losses. The efficient operating costs may be substantially 
below what can realistically be achieved in the near term, raising questions of how best 
to motivate improvements without greatly increasing the risk placed on the company. 
One appealing but risky strategy is to specify in detail how tariffs will be set over a 
realistic time horizon (4-5 years) and how they will be revised periodically thereafter, 
and then invite bids for the right to these revenue streams. This avoids one problem - 
that of determining the speed with which the company is able to drive costs down to the 
efficient level, but creates several others: the problem of determining the initial asset 
value, the greater problem of how to reset the tariff, and the related risk of receiving a 
relatively low privatisation sales price and/or granting a politically unacceptably high 
return to the buyers. 
  The issue of the initial RAB can be partially finessed by determining the 
politically acceptable level of tariffs, predicting a realistic revenue stream, deducting a  
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predicted path of operating costs (starting at the current level, and converging on the 
efficient level), determining a required rate of return to finance new investment, and then 
discounting future profits to determine the initial RAB. This may bear little relation 
either to the (revalued) book value or to the sales price, and in any case is primarily a 
device for determining depreciation, and uprating its value for new investment for 
resetting the price cap at the next review. It still runs into the problems of determining 
the required rate of return (or the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC), and the 
risks attached to forecasting future costs and revenues. 
  There are a variety of methods that have been tried to address these risks. In 
Chile, the method of determining the WACC is prescribed in legislation and is related to 
the performance of the local stock exchange. That may be reasonable where there is a 
liquid capital market and where most distribution finance is locally sourced (with a large 
share of debt). It is less plausible where these conditions are absent. Some of the risk can 
be shared by variants of sliding-scale regulation, where if the costs or revenues deviate 
from the value specified by the regulator (or in the prospectus), the deviations are shared 
between the consumers and utility. Thus if revenue were 20% less than specified, but 
costs were as specified, and the sharing rule were 50:50, the utility would be entitled to 
increase tariffs by enough to raise the revenue to 10% less than forecast. Often these 
bands are capped, so that deviations outside the band fall entirely on or solely benefit 
consumers, limiting the downside risks to the owner. The shortfall in profits might have 
to be underwritten as a claim on the initial privatisation sales receipts, where there is 
little confidence in the ability of the regulator to secure tariff and specifically 
consequential revenue increases. 
  Here is not the place to speculate on how best to address these various problems, 
which will be better illuminated in due course as experience accumulates. Chile has been 
commended and criticised by basing distribution tariffs on a hypothetical distribution 
company. One advantage is that it allows a determination of the unit total cost (including 
the return on capital) with strong incentives to outperform, but it suffers from either high 
realised rates of return (the current criticism) or excessive risk and/or inadequate returns 
to underwrite investment (to avoid which the tariffs may have to be set so high as to risk 
the first objection). 
  One possibility is for the buyer to tender not just for the amount to be paid, but 
the required rate of return to equity. The company with the cheapest net cost of 
distribution would then be chosen. The required return might be based on an assumed 
50:50 equity:debt and made a function of the credit rating of the country (or some other 
measure of the cost of capital on the international market, which can change for better or 
worse over the likely future). The more dimensions across which bids need to be judged, 
the harder it is to ensure a transparent and fair tender auction. Often the rate of 
investment in new connections, metering, and possible refurbishment may also be 
components on which the bid is judged, and some of these may need to be 
predetermined to reduce the dimensionality of the bid.  
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  There is relatively little experience in resetting tariffs (apart from the very 
unsatisfactory annual revisions in Orissa), so it remains to see whether the system 
described earlier, which has been tried and tested in the UK and is being tested in The 
Netherlands, will translate to developing countries (or to which ones). Several other 
issues have to be addressed in resetting tariffs, most obviously inflation but also the 
sensitivity to various cost drivers.  Thus the UK distribution revenue control takes the 
form RPI - X, with 50% fixed (in proportion to a predetermined projection of customer 
numbers) and 50% varying with the volume of demand (Ofgem, 1999).  Thus if the 
initial revenue is 100, the price level (RPI) increases by 12%, X, the efficiency factor, is 
set at 2%, and demand (kWh) grows by 8%, total revenue is allowed to rise in money 
terms by 100 x (1.12 - 0.02) x (1 + 0.5*0.08) = 110 x 1.04 = 114.4, and the real 
distribution cost per unit will have fallen by 5.4%. 
 
2.3.4  Tariff structure and setting the final price 
The distribution company will then need to decide how to set the various tariffs 
(Distribution Use of System, or DUOS charges) for HV, MV and LV and other tariff 
categories to collect this revenue.  The company will have an incentive to make these 
tariffs cost-reflective, for the formula for total revenue has been designed to cover total 
costs, so if one tariff is set above cost some other tariff will be below cost, and increases 
in sales under this tariff will result in losses.  The same steps will be needed for setting 
the Transmission Use of System charges for the use of the high tension transmission 
system or grid, together with charges for power losses and for any ancillary services 
provided by the grid company. 
  Once the wholesale (or ex-power station) price is determined, the main elements 
will then in place to determine the final prices of electricity delivered to franchise 
customers. This will be the wholesale price plus the TUOS (including other transmission 
services) and DUOS charges, and the amount needed to cover the cost of supply (billing, 
meter reading, contracting, etc).  If there is a single buyer, this process is relatively 
simple, but if distribution companies are free to contract with generators, then the final 
price for captive customers may need further regulation. On the one hand, the 
distribution company should be encouraged to achieve high levels of contract cover (to 
signal demand and mitigate possible generator market power). On the other hand, the 
ideal is to encourage efficient contracting and discourage sweetheart deals with 
subsidiaries. In The Netherlands, the regulator allows the distribution company to pass 
on a weighted average of the company's own contract costs and that of the rest of the 
companies, all of whom have to deposit full contract details with the regulator. This has 
good incentive properties but can expose companies to considerable purchase or 
contracting risk, depending on the weight attached to the share of other companies. 
Given that competitive contracting is likely to be associated with more mature and 
sophisticated markets, the added complexity may be reasonable in such cases. 
  The main mistake to avoid is regulating prices which contain volatile elements  
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without some means of passing through or insuring against fluctuations in uncontrollable 
components, of which the most important is the wholesale price. If the final price is 
capped, and the wholesale price free to increase sharply, and if the suppliers are not 
hedged with contracts, they will rapidly become bankrupt, as in California. Provided the 
distribution companies are not prevented from rebalancing their tariffs, and providing 
supply companies can pass through all the costs in the chain (the wholesale electricity 
price, TUOS, ancillary services, DUOS) with an adequate margin, then distribution 
companies can be privatised without necessarily waiting for a full restructuring of 
generation.  The converse, of privatising generation before setting in place the full 
mechanism for sustainable pricing of the downstream elements, is unwise and may be 
very costly, as will be argued below. 
  Privatisation in this context is only likely to be effective if the majority ownership 
passes to commercial owners.  Voucher privatisation, coupled with allocations to local 
authorities and only minority sales allowed to strategic investors (for example as 
followed in the Czech Republic and popular in Eastern Europe), may fail to create true 
owners concerned with and empowered to pursue profits by cutting costs.  Partial 
privatisation without satisfactory governance may merely create vested interests 
opposing necessary further reforms, and essentially loses the option value of state 
ownership - where the option is to make major reforms without the need for excessively 
complex compensation arrangements to other owners. 
 
2.3.5  Rebalancing and raising tariffs 
Electricity consumption in middle and higher income countries is extremely price and 
income inelastic.  Electricity is therefore an essential service whose price has important 
distributional implications. Subsidising electricity appears politically attractive as it can 
approximate a lump-sum grant, targeted in proportion to the number of household 
members. Conversely, raising the price of electricity appears like a lump-sum tax 
bearing heavily on the poor, those with large families, and, in cold countries, the 
vulnerable and old. Raising prices to households is highly politically sensitive, and the 
Conservative Government in Britain was defeated on an attempt to raise value added tax 
from the low to the standard rate (from 8% to 17.5%). The incoming Labour 
Government immediately implemented its election promise to cut the VAT to 5% (the 
lowest level allowed by the EU). 
  Countries in Central and Eastern Europe face similar strong political opposition 
and have found it very difficult to even maintain price increases for electricity in line 
with general inflation. Only very determined efforts such as those in Hungary have 
managed to restore real electricity prices to their pre-1989 levels, and even there they are 
still some way below the cost-reflective level. They can be kept down by not rewarding 
the capital embodied in the transmission and distribution networks, and paying 
generation the average rather than marginal cost of generation, again ignoring most of 
the capital value of the equipment. Generation prices may not have to move as much as  
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might be expected from this description, as the average total cost of new gas-fired 
generation may be below the average variable cost of inefficient old coal-fired 
generation - as seems to be the case in Hungary and was certainly the case in Britain. 
Nevertheless, in many countries generation prices will have to rise if the wholesale price 
is to reflect the entry price of new generation. 
  The margin between wholesale and retail prices can be kept at a lower level in the 
medium run by effectively writing down the asset value and hence the Regulatory Asset 
Base, but over time as new investment is added to the RAB, the capital cost element in 
transmission and distribution will gradually rise. Such a gradual adjustment will be 
politically less painful than a sudden increase, but the cost will be reduced proceeds from 
the sale of the transmission and distribution companies. The value may be politically 
unacceptably low, in which case the regulatory formula may have an additional K factor 
(as in RPI - X + K for the price cap), raising prices more rapidly to ensure adequate cash 
flow for new investment.  This would increase the flotation value while preserving a 
smooth transition from current to equilibrium prices. 
  Other strategies are available to ease the transition to cost-reflective prices. Many 
countries offer a life line level of sales, under which the first 50 kWh per month may be 
provided at a subsidised rate, but levels above this pay the marginal efficient price. That 
way the rents associated with past investment in the network can be transferred 
selectively to households without removing incentives for efficient consumption at the 
margin. In some countries, commercial, regulatory, and eventually political pressures 
conspire to eliminate this lifeline element (Hungary is the most recent example in 1999). 
There would seem to be no reason for subsidising industrial and commercial customers, 
who together probably account for two-thirds of total demand. Agricultural users 
represent a politically intractable problem in some countries like India, where the 
inefficiencies of underpricing electricity are more serious: socially more expensive 
electric pumps for tube wells may displace perfectly adequate diesel pumps. It may be 
necessary to grandfather existing connections where pumps are already installed but to 
only offer new connections at commercially feasible tariffs. Existing grandfathered 
rights may have to be time limited to the expected life of a tubewell pump and lifeline 
rates with marginal prices at efficient levels may also be attractive. Whether any of these 
rather complex schemes are viable given likely levels of corruption and whether it is 
reasonable to impose them on privatised or franchised license holders (as commercial 
suppliers would not willingly offer such tariffs) is unproven.  At best they offer a 
temporary transitional arrangement which should have a strong sunset clause to prevent 
future unnecessary complications. 
  Underpricing electricity in poorer countries is far less defensible on income 
distributional grounds.  The main beneficiaries are invariably the richer urban dwellers, 
and the costs are felt indirectly by the poor, who may be deprived of the chance of 
electricity provision at all because of the inability to finance extensions of the system.  
Electric light is substantially cheaper than kerosene or other alternatives, and consumers  
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are willing to pay high prices for a minimum level of consumption that provides light, 
TV and other modest appliance use.  Unfortunately, political support may be 
concentrated in urban areas where consumption is highest. Even here, improvements in 
quality (avoiding blackouts and brownouts) may more than compensate for increases in 
prices. 
  Suppose that it is politically impossible to raise electricity tariffs to households in 
less than five or so years. Would it still be possible and desirable to privatise distribution 
companies? The evidence from Central Europe is that it can be done, with the advantage 
of launching the process of regulatory reform and restructuring that should eventually 
lead, with careful decision making, to a fully liberalised ESI. The main problem will be 
to maintain a low wholesale price of electricity for at least the household franchise while 
establishing regulated transmission and distribution charges and a cost pass through 
mechanism for the energy price. 
  Generating companies would then require contracts of a suitable duration (the 
length of the transition period) to deliver fixed amounts of power at low prices, though 
they might be freed to sell surplus power at the market clearing price. Prices to non-
household customers could then be raised to efficient levels, and trading between 
eligible customers and generating companies introduced. The main problem with this 
arrangement is to provide credible and efficient price signals for the entry of new power 
generation. If most or all electricity passes through a bulk wholesale market or pool, or if 
the power exchange is sufficiently liquid to produce stable and transparent price signals, 
then household consumers can be protected by contracts while allowing the wholesale 
price to give efficient price signals. The main problem then lies in creating satisfactory 
wholesale markets, and resolving the structure of contracts between generators and 
suppliers. The objective is to protect or subsidise sensitive parts of the market without 
discouraging competition in generation and supply to eligible customers, and to end 
fiscal profligacy as soon as possible. 
 
2.3.6  Options where privatising distribution is not yet viable 
It may be that the prospects of early privatisation of distribution are so poor that there is 
no point in proceeding. Would it still be sensible to set up an independent regulatory 
agency when there is little immediate prospect of privatising distribution? The answer 
would appear to be yes. Among developed countries, Norway, has had a successful 
independent electricity regulator, in the presence of continuing significant state and 
municipal ownership (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). The Chilean example also suggests a 
positive answer, as part of a dedicated attempt by a specialist agency to reform and 
restructure tariffs, and devise incentives for improved performance. The obvious danger 
is that if the distribution company is politically powerful enough to resist the kinds of 
reform needed to make privatisation viable (reducing theft, sacking excess workers, etc), 
then it is likely to be powerful enough to sideline and discredit the regulator. Reform 
commitment requires adequate political power and support before it makes sense to start  
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on the task. 
  Taking a pessimistic view that neither privatising distribution nor creating an 
independent regulator is currently feasible, the next question is whether it is possible to 
consider reforms elsewhere in the ESI, and specifically whether it is sensible to involve 
private investors and owners in generation. 
 
3.  Private involvement in generation 
 
The private sector can be involved in generation in two ways. Privatisation normally 
means the sale of a majority controlling share in existing generation companies, possibly 
retaining nuclear power stations (and/or major multi-use hydroelectric dams) in publicly 
owned companies. If generation is to be privatised, then the state electricity company or 
board will need to be further subdivided into a large enough number of competing 
companies. The second way is to invite Independent Power Producers, IPPs, to tender to 
supply the (preferably restructured) state electricity company, thus bringing new private 
investment into the industry with more modest reform and restructuring. 
  In both cases, the logical first step is to separate transmission from generation and 
to create the conditions for regulated third party access (rTPA) to transmission. Again, 
transmission will need to be regulated (and similar principles apply as in distribution, but 
with fewer problems if, as seems sensible (at least for a transitional period), transmission 
remains in public ownership. That argument is defended below when transmission issues 
are considered in more detail. The argument for separation (preferably ownership 
separation) of transmission from generation are by now standard. A transmission 
company that has ownership stakes in generation is likely to favour its own generation 
over that of other owners. This may not be so serious where all new capacity is put up to 
tender auction, and the transmission company acts as the Single Buyer, described below. 
It creates far more serious problems if the intention is to create a competitive and less-
heavily regulated wholesale market with free and contestable entry, as an increasing 
number of examples testify (see e.g. the problems in Chile and Scotland). 
  There are two quite different ways of introducing competition into generation.  
The first is to create a wholesale spot market (Pool) or a power exchange (PX) where 
generators can sell directly to suppliers and/or final buyers.  The EU Electricity Directive 
requires that buyers taking more than 40 GWh (actually those accounting for at least 
26.48% of total demand) should be free (eligible) to contract with generators from 19 
February 1999, and that this threshold should drop to 9 GWh (33% of the market) by 19 
February 2003.  In many countries, this may only involve a few hundred, rising to a few 
thousand buyers, though clearly they account for a significant fraction of total demand.  
If distribution companies (more accurately, the supply businesses with the licence to 
supply non-eligible customers in the distribution area) are counted as eligible buyers, 
then all electricity would need to be sold to suppliers. 
  If eligible buyers are to buy from suppliers or generators, there must be a market  
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or exchange where the buying and selling can take place. The parties will need access to 
the transmission and distribution systems to ensure delivery, best arranged under a 
system of regulated Third Party Access.  This approach goes naturally with an 
authorization procedure for building new generation capacity, under which IPPs are free 
to enter the industry provided they obtain authorization (planning permission, 
environmental clearance, and satisfy any restrictions on the choice of fuel). 
  The second approach to introducing competition into generation is the Single 
Buyer Model (SBM), under which the transmission company (which may also be 
vertically integrated into generation and even distribution and supply, as was Electricité 
de France) is the single buyer of all public electricity generated.  Competition takes the 
form of periodic tenders for new capacity, and the winners sign long term Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with the Single Buyer (SB). 
  The SBM is the only viable way in which IPPs can be invited to tender for long-
term PPAs, which are likely to be a precondition of any private investment in generation 
in an otherwise not very reformed industry. The SBM can also work if the existing 
power stations are sold to a number of generation companies, and that was the model 
followed when restructuring and privatising Northern Ireland. As the SBM is the only 
viable model for partial electricity reform, or where the distribution companies have not 
yet been privatised, we consider that first. 
 
3.1  The Single Buyer Model 
The standard SBM is one in which the SB contracts directly with all generation 
companies for their entire output.  In its extreme form, the SB is also the sole authorised 
seller of electricity, ruling out supply competition.  The EU Electricity Directive insists 
on market opening, so that if buyers are not allowed to contract directly with generators 
and instead the SB buys on behalf of customers, then the transmission operator (TO) 
must publish non-discriminatory tariffs for the use of the transmission and distribution 
system.  The SB is required to pay the producer a price equal to the price paid by the 
customer less the published transmission and distribution tariff (Article 18 (2).) The 
effect of this intentional restriction on the interpretation of the SBM is to make it 
functionally equivalent to rTPA, while leaving the SB with additional and relatively 
unattractive obligations. The intended result has been to make the EU version of the 
SBM very unattractive, with virtually no takers. The proposed reformed Electricity 
Directive would actually remove it as an option. 
  The standard interpretation of the SBM survives extensively in developing 
countries, and deserves more careful analysis before reaching the EU's view that it is an 
undesirable form of liberalisation. The obvious attraction is that it allows competitive 
tendering for the PPAs (securing which is likely to be a financial precondition for 
investing, even if it is not a formal requirement). An efficient PPA would specify the 
availability payment for capacity (payable per kW capacity when available for dispatch, 
possibly at different rates at different times of the year) and an energy payment, linked to  
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the fuel price, per MWh generated. Given these (and other technical parameters), the SB 
can determine which of the tenders represents best value or least cost (given various 
constraints such as fuel diversity, import dependence, foreign exchange exposure, etc.). 
Competitive tendering can indeed considerably reduce the cost of generation, 
particularly compared to bilateral negotiations between the incumbent SB and a selected 
generation company  (see Box 2).   
  Long-term PPAs appear to 
offer the attractions of permitting the 
rapid entry of private finance to 
meet growing electricity demands 
without the need for drastically 
restructuring the rest of the ESI.   
Indeed, in some cases, the tendering 
or negotiating process is just grafted 
on to a vertically integrated and 
otherwise unreformed ESI.  The 
risks are, however, considerable.  If 
the incumbent SB also owns 
generation, then it may preferentially 
select bids from its generation 
subsidiary (or bias the competition 
in favour of the subsidiary).   
Incumbents are loath to face the test 
of competition, which may reveal 
the high costs of current operations, 
and are well placed to disfavour 
attempts at entry by loading unreasonable conditions on entrants. Knowing this, potential 
entrants may be reluctant to undertake the considerable costs involved in preparing a 
credible bid, reinforcing the power of the incumbent and undermining the point of 
opening generation to outside investors. 
  Even where the SB genuinely opens competition to new entrants, and even if 
bribery and corruption can be prevented from biassing the outcome, the entrant will be 
selling to a monopsonist and will need strong assurances against ex post opportunism.  
That explains the necessity for long-term PPAs, and the frequent request that the 
contracts be guaranteed by the government, for the financial viability of the SB may be 
suspect.  The problem to which private investment by IPPs is the solution is, after all, the 
financial inability of the incumbent ESI to finance the necessary investment, which must 
cast doubt on its ability to service the implicit debt (ie the capacity availability payments 
in the PPA, which have debt-like qualities). 
  The recent Asian financial crisis demonstrated the risks attaching to PPAs, and 
the details are set out in World Bank (1999).  East Asia attracted over $US 80 billion 
Hungary invited tenders to build several 
conventional power stations of up to 200 MW 
capacity. Twenty-four bids were submitted and 
opened on 9 October 1998, with a gross capacity 
about six times the nominal capacity of the tender 
invitation.  The winners were AES Fonix Kft with a 
191 MW CCGT plant and Budapest Power Plant 
Ltd. with a 110 MW co-generation CCGT. The 
average total cost of electricity produced by AES 
FONIX will be 6.43 HUF/kWh, while that produced 
by the Kispesti plant will be 6.87 HUF/kWh (both 
assuming 7000 hours per year utilisation and 
indexed to January 1998).  The average price 
deflated by the Producer Price Index to January 
1997 would be 5.69 HUF/kWh (3.38 UScents/kWh). 
 The average price paid to the early CCGT entrants 
(in prices of the same date) was 8.4 HUF/kWh (5 
UScents/kWh), or some 45% higher, demonstrating 
the advantage of an open competitive tender. (see 
Bergman et al, 1999) 
  Box 2  Bidding in Hungary  
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into the power sector between 1994 and 1998, over half the total by developing countries 
in this sub-period, and substantially ahead of the only other major destination, Latin 
America with $53 billion. Five countries - China, The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand accounted for virtually all the investment in East Asia.  In 1996 68% of 
incremental power sector investment in East Asia was financed by private capital, and 
three-quarters of the investment was in green field projects, mostly in new generating 
stations (World Bank, 1999). In South Asia 95% of private investment was in green-
field sites, accounting for 38% of incremental power sector investment in 1996. In 
contrast, most of the investment in Latin America was for the purchase of divested 
publicly owned assets, with only one-third for financing new green-field capacity. 
Nevertheless, in 1996 86% of incremental power sector investment was privately 
financed. 
  Reforming countries in Latin 
America restructured and unbundled 
their ESIs, and created wholesale 
electricity markets. In contrast, East 
Asian countries invited private 
investment into generation through 
IPPs, with negligible restructuring 
and reform.  In South Asia, IPPs 
typically entered on the back of a 
PPA with the state-owned SB utility. 
  The PPA typically involved 
payment in dollars, and required 
government guarantees as default 
proceedings against a state-owned 
utility are not normally allowed (see 
Box 3). 
  The financial crisis that 
started in South Asia in 1997 had a dramatic negative impact on GDP growth rates and 
hence on electricity demand, as well as on the exchange rate. Between the end of 1996 
and the end of 1997, the exchange rate in the Philippines against the dollar moved from 
26.3 pesos to 40 pesos, in Thailand from 25.6 baht to 47.3 baht, and in Indonesia from 
2383 Rupiahs to 4650 Rupiahs. Whereas the currencies of Thailand and the Philippines 
stabilised between the end of 1997 and 1998, in Indonesia the currency fell further to 
8025 Rupiahs (and in Sep 2001 stood at 9603 Rupiahs). 
  The collapse in currencies caused a doubling in the domestic cost of electricity 
under the PPAs, which the state-owned power company was reluctant to pass on to final 
consumers.  Malaysia, which experienced a more modest devaluation from 2.53 
Ringgits/$ at the end of 1996 to 3.89 Ringgits at the end of 1997, nevertheless faced 
PPAs as high as 8.5 UScents/kWh but charged consumers less than 2 cents/kWh after 
The state-owned Indonesian electricity company, 
Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) had 21.3 GW 
capacity at the end of 1996, and 39 projects with 30 
GW planned capacity under development or under 
construction.  The US Energy Information 
Administration reported in Jan. 1999 that at least 26 
private power projects with 24.8 GW capacity were 
at risk of bankruptcy.  Most PPAs with PLN are in 
US$, and PLN was forecasting losses of $1-2 billion 
in 1999, and has not been able to meet its payment 
obligations.  Hopewell Holdings declared force 
majeure and suspended work on the 1.32 GW 
Tanjung Jati-B project, started in 1996 and due early 
1999.  PLN's losses have in part been attributed to 
alleged corruption, and the government has agreed 
to independent auditing, as proposed by the IMF. 
(see World Bank, 1999) 
  Box 3  Force Majeure in Indonesia  
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the crisis (World Bank, 1999, p20).  These events created financial crises for the power 
companies and for the governments - for example in the Philippines the foreign debt of 
the National Power Corporation was more than 20% of the total national debt. (World 
Bank 1999 p.20). The fall in demand created strong pressures to renege on, delay or 
renegotiate PPAs, further amplifying the loss in confidence of foreign investors. 
  It became painfully clear that 
this form of private investment in 
power generation is equivalent to 
expensive foreign debt borrowed by 
the government. The true cost of the 
debt may be concealed by the terms 
of the PPAs, but the interest rates are 
inevitably high because of risk and 
the source of finance.  Private 
investors inevitably borrow at higher 
rates of interest than institutions like 
the World Bank, even in stable 
markets, but the risk of lending to 
state-enterprises in corrupt economies is perceived by the foreign investor to be 
particularly high, particularly given recent events (see Box 4).  Some governments 
attempted to repudiate the debts entered into by their predecessors, often on claims of 
corrupt dealing, while other governments had to reschedule if not default. Nor has this 
form of private involvement led to much restructuring of the sector, and has not 
addressed the underlying problem of non cost-reflective tariffs set at non-remunerative 
levels - if anything, the currency crisis seems to have made this worse. 
 
3.1.1  Contrasts between the Single Buyer Model and a liberalised wholesale market 
Contrast the effects of a currency crisis under the SBM with that under a well-
functioning liberalised electricity market in which IPPs sell electricity spot and under 
contract to final consumers. If the IPPs have confidence in the continued 
competitiveness of the wholesale electricity market, and the liquidity of the contract 
market, they will not feel the need to sign very long-term contracts in order to protect 
their investment. It would be normal for them to sign a sequence of shorter-term 
contracts (1-3 years) with franchise distribution/supply companies. These franchise 
holders will in turn be concerned to contract for most if not all of their forecast demand, 
creating the right conditions for a viable contract market. (Of course, these conditions 
are only plausible where the distribution companies have reformed their tariffs and 
practices to ensure that they are credit-worthy.) 
  In the event of a financial crisis with a collapse in demand and of the exchange 
rate, much will then depend on how the IPP is financed. If the local capital market is 
reasonably well developed, and the IPP has issued local debt and purchases domestically 
Pakistan's state power company, Wapda (Water and 
Power Development Authority) has contracts with 
19 private power producers, together with the Hub 
power company, which is the largest private power 
plant in the developing world.  The Government of 
Pakistan has been in dispute with these companies 
since 1997, and in July 1999, set up the 11th 
committee to attempt to resolve the dispute.  The 
companies were accused of bribing Wapda to raise 
tariffs, but the formula for setting tariffs had still not 
been agreed two years later. 
  Box 4  Problems in Pakistan  
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produced fuel, it will be insulated against the currency change (though not fully if the 
fuel is internationally traded). A collapse in electricity demand will almost certainly lead 
to a fall in the (dollar) spot price of electricity, reducing the profits to the IPP, and 
possibly leading to attempts by suppliers to renegotiate contracts. If some suppliers 
declare bankruptcy, the financial plight of the IPP will be adversely affected, but there is 
no obvious reason why the government need guarantee the terms under which the IPP 
chose to enter the market. The fall in spot electricity prices will be beneficial to eligible 
customers buying on short term contracts and this will reduce the deflationary effect on 
electricity demand. 
  The natural monopoly transmission and distribution companies should not be 
particularly adversely affected by the shock, for their revenue will be indexed to 
inflation, and any fall in revenue should be matched by a comparable fall in operating 
costs. Although the competitive elements of generation and supply may face financial 
difficulties and even bankruptcy, the plant will remain after creditors have sorted out 
claims, while new suppliers can enter the industry and ensure the continued viability of 
the ESI as a whole.  
 
3.1.2  The case for the SBM 
The SBM can misallocate risks between foreign investors and the domestic electricity 
company where the latter remains in state ownership, and can be a poor substitute for 
traditional forms of financing electricity investment from multilateral sources. It risks 
stranding contracts that complicate further restructuring, and creates heavy debts instead 
of resolving the financial problems of the sector. Having said that, the Californian 
experience suggests that crises triggering bankruptcy are unlikely to be left to the market 
to resolve even where the wholesale market has been liberalised, as in the somewhat 
optimistic scenario just described. IPPs know that in turbulent markets random and ill-
considered political interventions are to be expected, and will increase shareholder risk. 
They are very unlikely to invest in most developing countries without strong guarantees 
(of the kind long-term PPAs are designed to provide), unless they have unusual 
confidence in the sensible management of the host country. Such countries in turn are 
unlikely to experience poorly-managed foreign exchange crises (Argentina could be an 
exception). It is therefore little comfort to argue that SBM risks can be avoided by 
liberalised electricity markets, as too many countries lack the necessary preconditions to 
make that a plausible solution.  
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  That raises the question 
whether there are any circumstances 
in which the SBM with IPPs holding 
long-term PPAs is part of a sensible 
reform strategy? Bangladesh 
provides an interesting test case. 
Recent PPAs signed with the state-
owned Bangladesh Power 
Development Board with IPPs 
building high-efficiency CCGT 
burning low-cost indigenous gas 
look sensibly priced, although the 
distribution companies still need 
major reform to be able to pay for 
the power (Box 5). Some of the 
foreign exchange risk is hedged by 
indigenous fuel, though this is 
obtained under contract from 
International Oil Companies at 
prices linked to the international oil price. It would be open to Bangladesh to export 
surplus gas and provide a better foreign exchange risk. Meanwhile, the new IPPs 
provide power at lower cost than recent emergency measures and compared to the cost 
of unserved power, which may be 5-50 times as high. 
  These IPPs provide a benchmark against which to measure the performance of 
the state-owned generation, and put pressure on the supply chain to collect revenues to 
avoid bankrupting the single buyer. In theory, an SB owning transmission is ideally 
placed to ensure payment, for it would be hard to bypass, and provided it can enforce 
payment by disconnection without major civil unrest, its monopoly power provides the 
necessary credit-worthiness. On the other hand, the reform is so modest in its disruptive 
effect that it may allow the continuation of all the poor practices that precipitated the 
demand for reform in the first place, merely delaying the credit crunch for a few years by 
finding another sources of off-balance sheet de facto public sector borrowing. 
  What are the alternatives? Borrowing from IFIs is obviously cheaper than 
commercial borrowing by private companies operating in high credit-risk countries, even 
where the IPPs secure sovereign guarantees for their PPAs. High profile disputes, such 
as that involving Enron at Dabhol, Maharashtra, can only increase the cost of financing 
such borrowing. However, the IFIs are increasingly arguing that continued financial 
support to the power sector regardless of that sector's financial performance has similar 
effects as the "soft budget constraint" that undermined efficiency in Soviet-type planned 
economies. IPPs are a test of the commitment of governments to serious financial 
reform. As countries demonstrate their success in meeting the terms of PPAs, so the cost 
Faced with severe power shortages, the Government 
of Bangladesh invited competitive bids for four 
barge-mounted plants, which can be delivered to the 
site rapidly, though at relatively high cost. The first 
(oil-powered) plant of 110 MW, commissioned in 
1998, delivered power at 9 cents/kWh, nearly 
double the retail price. The next two (gas-powered) 
plants sold power at just under 5 cents/kWh), also 
above the retail price. 
  In contrast to these hasty and costly 
solutions, the AES Haripur CCGT plant, due to be 
commissioned in July 2001, will deliver 360 MW at 
about 3 cents/kWh, based on a gas price of 
$2.40/mmBTU (compared to state-owned power 
stations, which buy at $1/mmBTU), remarkably 
cheap by international standards. The next IPP at 
Meghnaghat of 450 MW is to deliver in 2003 at a 
reported levelized tariff of UScents2.8/kWh. 
  Box 5 Better PPAs in Bangladesh  
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of those PPAs will decrease. Refusing to provide further loans except to assist sector 
reform forces the government to start the reform process. The risk is that reluctant 
reformers will do the least possible. Inviting in IPPs with offers of long-term PPAs with 
sovereign guarantees in an otherwise unreformed ESI is the least disruptive step, and 
delays the pain until the next financial crisis. 
  Is this a reasonable approach for the IFIs? The main difference lies in the terms of 
the loan (IPPs have higher interest payments over shorter time horizons). This has the 
advantage of delivering the penalties of reform failure more quickly and targeted more 
obviously on the failing sector, without necessarily removing the safety net of 
IMF/World bank support at the next financial crisis. It may lead to more imprudent 
borrowing by the state electricity company as the IFIs disengage with the sector, or are 
ignored as they bring only criticism, not cash, to the table. Bangladesh has embarked on 
an uneconomic coal mine to provide fuel for an high cost, low efficiency and 
uneconomic coal-fired power station, financed by Chinese supplier credit, rather than 
exploiting her indigenous low cost gas in high efficiency CCGT stations, though this 
may just be further evidence of mismanagement or worse of the state electricity board. 
  The SBM can make sense as part of a programme that reforms and privatises the 
distribution companies, though it makes sense that a reasonable fraction of PPAs are 
linked to domestic prices (and are financed in large part by domestic capital), using fuels 
that are also priced in domestic currency. It is a risky strategy if the distribution 
companies are not credit worthy, and have not reformed their tariffs to meet the terms of 
the new PPAs. It may precipitate further reforms, or it may plunge the sector into further 
financial distress, leading to further deterioration in plant as maintenance is delayed.  
 
3.2  Restructuring generation and transmission as part of wider reforms 
Let us return to the case in which a country is firmly committed to radical reform, and 
has signalled this by restructuring tariffs, has started to unbundle the industry, setting up 
the regulatory authority under suitable legislation, and is well on track to privatise the 
distribution companies. What additional steps need to be taken? 
  Many countries already have a number of separate distribution companies, 
organised on a regional basis (unless the country is very small), but it is quite common 
for the transmission company to be vertically integrated with generation.  There are 
historically good reasons for this, as planning the location of new generation needs to be 
coordinated with building the necessary transmission lines.  Central dispatch is also 
standard, and again requires close coordination between the transmission operator (TO) 
and individual power stations.  Stations need to be brought on line in merit order 
(cheapest stations providing base load, followed by stations with higher avoidable cost 
providing mid merit and peaking power), but the TO must ensure that transmission lines 
are not overloaded.  These transmission constraints may require the TO to dispatch 
stations out of merit order.  The TO will also need to obtain ancillary services to 
maintain the stability of the system, and so needs to be able to call on or instruct stations  
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to provide these services at short notice. 
  These coordination benefits can still be obtained if generation is unbundled from 
transmission, and any small loss in these synergies ought to be more than offset by 
improvements in efficiency in generation resulting from competition.  The evidence 
from England and Wales suggests that considerable improvements can also be wrung 
out of transmission companies with the sharper focus that a separate business provides. 
  Central dispatch can be maintained and certainly the TO will need to obtain and 
provide ancillary services, either through contracts, tenders, or by spot purchases in a 
balancing or reserve market.  The main problem to resolve is the planning of new 
transmission lines, and designing a system to ensure efficient location of new generation 
plant.  A variety of models are available, and their lessons are being closely studied 
(EEE, 1999).  Whichever one is chosen, charges for using the transmission system will 
need to be set at a level that can finance network expansion (if necessary, not out of 
current cash flow, but out of borrowing secured on the future revenues that will be 
allowed once the investment is in place).  Transmission charges may be spatially 
differentiated to encourage generators to locate efficiently, though this may be achieved 
by the capital charge for connection to the system.
9 
  The difficulty in setting and regulating an efficient set of transmission charges 
provides one of the strongest arguments for vertically unbundling transmission from 
generation.  Otherwise the incumbent TO will devise charges (particularly "deep" 
connection charges) which favour related incumbent generators and disfavour entrants, 
thus raising their costs and allowing existing generators to set higher wholesale prices.  
This unbundling is therefore one of the most important steps in restructuring and 













                                                 
     
9  There are two different philosophies guiding the method of signalling location.  If a new generator 
connection requires extensive reinforcement over the whole network, this may be charged to the new 
generator (as a "deep" connection charge) or it may be smeared over all generators ("shallow" 
connection charges), but in the latter case annual charges may be spatially differentiated to signal 
location decisions.  England and Wales adopt this second approach.  
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3.2.1 Restructuring generation 
If the generation companies are 
separated from transmission, they 
will need to be placed in a number 
of companies, with some revenue 
security if they are to be privatised.  
If the remaining transmission 
company is to become the single 
buyer, inheriting any existing PPAs 
with IPPs, and if the existing 
companies are to be sold, then they 
will need comparable and suitable 
PPPAs. This approach has been 
favoured in Cental European 
transitional countries as a means of 
financing refurbishment, and has 
both risks and benefits.  If the aim is 
to created a fully liberalised wholesale market, then additional steps may be required. 
  In some cases the grid company or its predecessor power and transmission 
company may have existing PPAs with recently entered IPPs.  If the grid company has 
been operating as a SB, then it may well have acquired a set of long-term PPAs, even 
where the generation companies remain state-owned (see Box 6).  In each case it 
becomes important to decide whether, and if so how, to renegotiate any existing PPAs, 
and what contractual arrangements to put in place for any newly created generation 
companies. 
  The simplest case is where all generation is state-owned, in which case any 
existing PPAs can be renegotiated, with only bureaucratic obfuscation preventing a 
rational resolution of any problems.  The first step is to determine a set of suitable 
contracts to be held between the generating companies and the suppliers.  Even where 
supply is to be liberalised, it is unlikely that more than 33% of sales (to the larger 
customers) will be open to competition for the first three years, leaving 67% or more to 
be sold to the franchise market.  The supply businesses associated with the distribution 
companies will therefore need licences with the obligation to supply all non-eligible 
customers in the franchise area.  In Britain, these licences are termed Public Electricity 
Supply (PES) licences, and contain within them the obligations and regulatory 
conditions.  The PES licence holders are the logical counterparties to generation 
contracts, and in Britain the Regional Electricity Companies or RECs who held the PES 
licences were given contracts of up to three year's duration before they and the 
generators were privatised.  Note that the contract question will have to be settled before 
the distribution companies can be privatised, and so should be set in train as soon as 
The Polish ESI was restructured and unbundled in 
1990, and by the end of 1993 consisted of 18 system 
power plants, 24 combined heat and power stations, 
33 distribution companies, and one national grid 
company, Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne SA, 
PSE, acting as a strong single buyer (and retaining 
much of the expertise of the previously integrated 
power company).  The generation companies had to 
borrow at rather high rates of interest to finance 
expensive refurbishment and pollution clean-up 
investment, which was secured against 24 long-term 
PPAs with PSE covering 65% of supply.  These 
PPAs, many of which are effectively stranded 
contracts, are greatly complicating attempts to 
prepare the industry for privatisation. 
  Box 6  Stranded PPAs in Poland  
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possible. 
 
3.2.2 Creating a competitive wholesale market 
The detailed design of the contracts will depend on the design of the wholesale market, 
and need not detain us, except to note the considerable advantage of financial contracts 
over physical contracts.  As the object is to create a competitive wholesale market for 
electricity, we can presuppose either a pool or a power exchange, in either case with a 
well-defined reference wholesale price at each moment.  The natural choice of contract 
is then either a one-sided or two-sided Contract for Differences (CfDs).  A one-sided 
CfD would have a price reflecting the value of the right but not the obligation to buy up 
to M MWh at a strike price c (similar to an efficient two-part PPA with a capacity and 
energy element).  A two-sided CfD would have a price (possibly zero or negative) in 
return for the obligation to pay the strike price less the reference price (normally the pool 
price) times the specified number of MW to the contract holder, who earns the reference 
(pool) price if he is dispatched and receives the strike price less the reference price 
whether or not he generates. 
  Such contracts are needed to ensure a smooth transition to the new liberalised 
market, and to give stability to revenue forecasts of the contract holders (on both sides of 
the market), to allow them to be valued for sale.  Contracts also reduce problems of 
market power in generation, as we shall discuss below.  If past investments in generation 
have been financed by bank loans secured on PPAs with the SB, then these PPAs should 
be renegotiated into these new contracts.  These are likely to be of shorter duration than 
the standard commercial PPA with a SB (perhaps 3-5 years, rather than 5-15 years for 
PPAs with the SB).  They will be purely financial contracts (ie payments are not 
contingent on the dispatch of the underlying plant, or even its continued existence).  The 
renegotiated PPAs will be then be equal to sensible (ie commercially viable) contracts, 
but may not be sufficient to underwrite the original debt.  The difference between the 
capital value of the new contracts and the original debt is a measure of the size of the 
stranded contracts. 
  If these stranded debts are still significant, they will need to be dealt with before 
privatisation.  The simplest solution is to transfer these remaining debts to the state, 
preferably at the same time renegotiating the entire original debt package to reflect the 
sovereign guarantee now explicitly underwritten by the government.  When the 
government comes to sell the grid and the distribution companies, they can be furnished 
with a suitable amount of long-term debt to the government (in local currency), so that 
their debt-equity ratio is appropriate for a regulated natural monopoly (ie quite high, 
perhaps 50%).  Effectively the government will have transferred the stranded debt 
component of the original PPAs to the grid and distribution companies, with the possible 
advantage of refinancing it on more favourable terms.  Once the distribution companies 
are sold, the government should receive more than enough cash to liquidate any 
temporary increase in the national debt caused by this refinancing operation.  
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  It may be objected that crystallising the debt component of the PPAs as a liability 
of the government will reduce the net sales value of the privatisation and thus make it 
less attractive to the government.  This raises the question of how to value the natural 
monopoly elements (the distribution companies and the grid), and how the generation 
companies will be valued.  Note the asymmetry in the two questions, for the value of 
existing generators in a competitive market into which entry is expected will be derived 
from the competitive price, which will be equal to the average cost of generation from 
new entrants.
10  Once the future wholesale price of electricity is known, the profits of 
operating the plant can be deduced from a knowledge of its fixed and short-run 
avoidable costs (which will determine how much it generates and at what price), and 
then the present value of its profits calculated. 
  The value of the natural monopoly elements will be determined by the amount of 
revenue that the regulator chooses to allow the companies.  Here the government faces a 
classic trade-off.  If the aim is to realise a certain target value for the grid and 
distribution companies, then this value is the logical choice for the regulatory asset base 
(RAB) on which the owners will expect to receive a rate of return, and which will be 
depreciated over some specified period (related to the average remaining life of the 
assets).  The interest on and depreciation of the RAB will be a (possibly large) part of 
the allowed revenue, which will be recovered from TUOS and DUOS charges and 
which will directly affect the final price of electricity.  The higher the desired sales 
value, the higher the RAB and the higher will final electricity prices have to be. 
  If, in contrast, the government is anxious not to increase final electricity prices 
too rapidly, it will have to specify a time path for prices (in real terms) from their 
present, presumably uneconomically low, level to a cost-reflective level at some future 
date.  The implied time path of revenue (final sales revenue less the cost of purchasing 
power) will then be determined, as will gross profit, and hence the present value of the 
cash flows to the buyer.  This present value will represent the most the buyer is willing 
to bid for the company.  Lower electricity prices, or longer periods for their adjustment, 
will translate into lower sales values for the companies. 
  These calculations can be made completely independently of any stranded 
contracts or inherited debts.  If these debts are to be recovered by higher total receipts, 
then prices will have to be higher (and consumers will pay for the past debts), whilst if 
prices are already politically determined, so is the total value of the assets against which 
the debts represent a liability. 
  Once the problem PPAs have be resolved and the generators and franchise 
suppliers provided with commercially sound contracts, the generators can be sold.  The 
aim is to create a competitive wholesale market, which requires a sufficient number of 
                                                 
     
10 Most developing countries expect rapid demand growth within a very short period, and even 
central and eastern europe, where there may appear to be excess capacity, is likely to experience entry, 
and/or is open to neighbouring markets where prices will be set by competition, and which can therefore 
be predicted.  
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companies competing with each other at each part of the market - valley, shoulder and 
peak hours of the day.  Some countries like Argentina have gone to the logical extreme 
of making almost every power station an independent company, while others have 
grouped power stations into a smaller number of companies.  The number required for a 
competitive outcome depends on the ease of entry and the degree to which the country is 
interconnected with other competitive markets.  An isolated system should aim for at 
least four competing companies in each isolated region - and an isolated region is 
defined as one that is only interconnected to other regions by capacity-constrained 
transmission links. 
  While there may be sound reasons of river management to place tightly linked 
hydro stations on the same river in one company, different hydro systems should be in 
different companies as there are no economies of scale or scope from integration.  Each 
company should either be small relative to the size of the (local) market or have a range 
of types of generation which is close to the margin when prices are both low and high (ie 
have avoidable costs which span the normal daily or seasonal price range).  That way no 
company will have much influence over the wholesale price. Restructuring an ESI 
dominated by hydro raises additional problems, particularly if further hydro expansion is 
least cost, or if a large proportion of generation is located in multi-use systems, as the 
example of Brazil above illustrates. Whether or not privatisation is sensible in such cases 
needs careful analysis. 
  Market power can be further reduced by encouraging or requiring plant to be 
contracted, for then the benefits of manipulating the wholesale price are only captured 
by the uncontracted margin of plant - the returns to the contracted volume are 
predetermined by the strike price of the contract.  If plant is 80% contracted, and there 
are 5 similar generation companies, each one has price-setting power equal to 20% of 
20% or only 4% of the total market.  Some countries adopt a belt-and-braces approach to 
controlling market power, by requiring bids to be based on audited marginal fuel costs, 
and constructing more or less elaborate systems of rewarding the fixed costs, and that 
may be desirable in smaller markets or as a transitional arrangement until the 
competitiveness of the market has been established. 
 
3.3  Ownership of the transmission grid 
The argument so far has been that privatising and regulating distribution companies is 
important for establishing sensible prices for electricity, and hence allowing generators 
to be paid viable prices. Privatising generation should wait until the wholesale market 
has been established and the terms under which electricity is sold to final customers has 
been clarified. Restructuring to separate generation from transmission should take place 
as early as possible. Of course, privatisation should not be considered until the 
legislative and regulatory framework is in place. So far, no mention has been made of 
privatising the transmission grid. There is considerably less agreement about the 
importance of privatisation, and the speed with which it needs to be completed if  
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privatisation is decided to be appropriate. 
  Social democrat countries in Europe typically prefer to retain the national grid 
under public ownership (just as they often have a preference for keeping distribution 
companies under municipal or regional ownership). Such countries often have well 
established and mature networks that need little expansion, and whose costs are a very 
small part of the total final price of electricity (typically only 5%). In other cases, 
strengthening and extending the transmission grid may have high priority, and the 
efficient management of its expansion is critical to the costs of delivering power to final 
customers. If the national grid is also charged to provide the transmission systems 
operator, who organises dispatch and secures ancillary services, then these commercial 
functions are best supplied by commercially oriented owners. The success of the 
electricity wholesale market and consequently the extent and speed to which efficiency 
improvements are passed through in lower prices will depend critically upon the design 
and operation of the wholesale market. If the grid remains in public ownership, it will be 
crucial that the commercial activities of systems operation, market management and 
operation are placed in a commercial organisation. Again, there are continuing debates 
about whether this should be entrusted to act pro bono publico or should be incentivised 
as a for-profit organisation subject to careful oversight. 
  One of the most persuasive arguments for delaying the privatisation of the 
National Grid is that it is particularly hard to value the assets, as in most cases 
transmission was previously bundled with generation. This will be even more of a 
problem if the grid combines transmission operations and if these transmission 
operations are incentivised by some cost sharing formula.  Many of the transactions 
between generators and the systems operator would previously have been internal 
transactions and would cancel out, but they will now become revenues for the TO and 
costs of the generation companies.  There will be no history of accounts, let alone 
regulatory accounts, of the grid under its previous integrated form, so any projections of 
revenue will have to be taken largely on trust.  These revenue forecasts will depend 
critically upon the way in which regulation operates and the extent to which costs can be 
reduced.  Of course, the same is true of the distribution companies, but they have usually 
been separate companies before and so have a set of accounts setting out their costs, so 
there is rather less uncertainty in their case. 
  The experience of National Grid Company (NGC) in England and Wales is 
relevant here. NGC’s shares were allocated to the Regional Electricity Companies, 
which were then privatised in 1990. The implied value of NGC at this flotation was 
about £2.3 billion (or £2.7 billion at 1996 prices, after allowing for new investment and 
depreciation). In 1996, NGC was floated on the stock exchange for £4.5 billion, 
suggesting that the initial underpricing was as high as 40%. It would clearly have been 
easier to value the revenue streams associated with NGC on the basis of several years' 
accounting results of the unbundled grid, as was possible at the second flotation. Instead, 
shareholders had to take the pro-forma accounts of the unbundled grid combined with  
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the RECs, which also combined supply businesses with which there was very little 
commercial experience, and were clearly not able to reach a very accurate valuation. 
  NGC is responsible for providing various services including payments for 
transmission constraints.  Originally the cost of these services were passed straight 
through as `uplift' - the difference between the payment to generators and the payment 
by suppliers.  In the first few years of Pool operation the charges for uplift more than 
doubled.  This raised concerns that NGC had inadequate incentives to reduce these costs. 
  In 1994/95 NGC started to receive incentive payments for managing various 
controllable costs, under which it bore some fraction of the cost in excess of a target 
(and received some fraction of any shortfall).
11  In 1994/95 these incentive payments 
amounted to £26 million out of total uplift of £752 million.  The effect of these 
incentives is to slightly increase the risk of NGC's income.  Resolving the way in which 
costs will be controlled clearly has an effect on the value of the business, and should 
ideally be done ahead of sale. 
  The other unresolved issue at the time of the initial privatisation what resetting 
the pattern of locational transmission charges, where there had not been enough time to 
agree a satisfactory methodology before sale. Rather than delay flotation, the 
government announced that the initial (somewhat arbitrary) set of charges would be 
reviewed after two years.  They were subsequently considerably revised and a new 
methodology for setting the charges was agreed and published.  NGC's regulated 
revenue was capped in line with the forecast growth in system maximum demand, and 
therefore should not have been affected by any rebalancing of charges.  Nevertheless, 
uncertainties about the charging methodology may have increased uncertainty about the 
value of the assets and so reduced the sales value.  
  The lesson is that it may take some time to develop a satisfactory set of regulated 
charges and incentives, and these may affect the reliability of revenue and cost forecasts. 
 The main problem (at least in Britain) was the absence of reliable accounts for the 
stand-alone grid business, which the passage of time would rapidly resolve. There is no 
obvious danger in delaying its privatisation for several years after the privatisation of 
distribution and generation, and may well be positive advantages. 
 
4.  Problems of market power with excess demand 
 
Where wholesale markets have worked well in developed economies it has been in large 
part because of excess generating capacity, modest demand growth, and the availability 
of cheap new plant which allows independent power producers to enter at modest scale, 
                                                 
     
11  These included ancillary services, transmission constraints (under which generators required to 
either to not generate when their bid was competitive, or required to generate even though their bid was 
uncompetitive, are paid the difference between the pool price and the station bid), demand forecasting 
errors, and transmission losses.  The maximum profit or loss that NGC can experience is capped at £50 
million.  
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putting downward pressure on wholesale prices. California has demonstrated that tight 
demand, low contract coverage, and a liberalised wholesale market can lead very rapidly 
to high prices and bankruptcy. Dependence on storage hydro systems (very common in 
Latin America) exposes countries to risk of periodic shortage and prolonged period of 
high prices in liberalised markets. 
  That raises the obvious question, whether competitive markets can work as well 
in developing countries suffering from a shortage of capacity, current excess demand 
and forecast rapid demand growth? The answer will depend critically upon the existence 
of credit-worthy electricity buyers (ideally suppliers) willing to enter into longer term 
contracts on the back of which new investment in generation can be financed. This is 
turn requires satisfactory pricing of transmission and distribution to ensure that the 
power can be delivered from the generator to the customers. If capacity is scarce, then 
the spot price in a competitive market can rise to very high levels - prices of more than 
$150/MWh are common at certain times of the day and times of the year in the British 
pool, and prices have certainly exceeded $1000/MWh both in the UK and the US in 
periods of very tight market conditions.  
  Provided franchise customers are adequately covered by contracts, which can be 
imposed upon existing state-owned generators at the time they are unbundled, high spot 
prices have the desirable advantage of signalling the attraction of entry and encouraging 
consumers to sign contracts to support and finance entry. They also efficiently ration 
scarce supply to consumers most willing to pay the high spot prices, and motivate them 
to seek out more attractive longer term arrangements. They therefore provide finance at 
the margin where it is needed without necessarily raising average prices to all 
consumers. Markets, contracts, and well regulated transmission and distribution charges 
therefore represent a significant improvement on a situation of power interruptions, 
underpriced electricity and an inability to finance the generation that is needed. 
  Nevertheless, although market power may be restrained in the short term through 
contracts, it will reappear when these contracts are due for renegotiation, at least if the 
generators are privately owned and cannot be coerced to sign new contracts.  Market 
power depends on the number of competing generators and the overall degree of market 
demand relative to capacity.  If demand is inelastic, and if all remaining generators 
cannot meet that demand, the remaining generator has considerable market power. In a 
competitive wholesale market, each generator will be aware of that power, and will offer 
at least marginal output at a high price.  Investment in response to the excess demand 
and high prices will reduce this market power if there are sufficiently many independent 
generating companies, but not if there are too few, at least until enough entry has taken 
place to alter the number of price-setting generators.  The evidence from Britain suggests 
that this may take a decade or more even under ideal entry conditions, and the 
implication is that the restructuring should aim to create at least four independent 
generation companies, and preferably more, right from the start. 
  If generators have apparent market power, the temptation to choose the Single  
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Buyer Model in order to countervail against such market power will be strong. The SBM 
effectively forces generators to sign long-term PPAs to avoid subsequent unattractive 
contract terms, unless they can be credibly offered Most Favoured Nation clauses (under 
which they will be offered terms as good as the best currently or recently offered).  Even 
this may be hard to enforce if contracts are confidential, and hence may be an 
unattractive alternative to a long-term PPA.  Perhaps an independent agency (the 
regulatory office) could announce the results of subsequent PPAs, allowing PPAs to 
have a re-opener such that after an initial period (5-10 years) the subsequent contract has 
to match the terms of PPAs accepted in tender auctions. 
  The alternative is to place all new PPAs with the franchise market, which can 
provide the security for long-term contracts. If and when the industry evolves towards a 
liberalised wholesale market with authorised entry and rTPA (current EU best practice) 
then the existing portfolio of PPAs would gradually be replaced by shorter term 
contracting in the spot market. This evolution would presumably only occur when the 
capacity shortage had been overcome so that the spot market were pricing reliably on 
average at the entry price. 
  Relying on contracts alone may not be sufficient to address issues of market 
power, and it is important that the regulator has sufficient power to address market 
power issues as well as setting the price-caps or tariffs in the regulated natural monopoly 
sectors. At least some EU countries have liberalised their electricity industries under the 
requirements of the Electricity Directive but failed to write the required information-
gathering and enforcement powers into their electricity legislation. It is most unlikely 
that such information will be voluntarily provided. A full-scale competition inquiry with 
the necessary powers to request information may take months, and fail to find evidence 
that would stand up to in court. If in addition generators are not required to hold a 
licence, regulators cannot follow the route open in Britain and modify the licence to 
prevent future abuse and to require provide necessary information to be routinely 
supplied. 
  The United States, with its more legalistic approach, is much clearer about the 
duties of regulators when liberalising. Under the Federal Power Act 1935, The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, has a statutory obligation to ensure that 
wholesale prices are "just and reasonable". If an electric utility wishes to sell at market-
determined wholesale prices, this will be only allowed providing "the seller (and each of 
its affiliates) does not have, or has adequately mitigated, market power in generation and 
transmission and cannot erect other barriers to entry."
12 Even then, the authority to sell at 
market-determined prices can be withdrawn and replaced by regulated prices if there is 
"any change in status that would reflect a departure from the characteristics the 
                                                 
     
12 Heartland Energy Services, Inc, 68 FERC & 61,223, at 62,060 (1994), cited by Bogorad and Penn 
(2001).  
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Commission has relied upon in approving market-based pricing."
13 
  FERC therefore assumes that market pricing is "just and reasonable" so long as it 
is competitive. The reason for its concern to ensure that prices remain competitive is that 
any FERC-approved form of pricing greatly restricts the competition authorities from 
intervening. At the same time, existing antitrust laws are relatively powerless to enforce 
competitive outcomes in the energy industry as "the antitrust laws do not outlaw the 
mere possession of monopoly power that is the result of skill, accident, or a previous 
regulatory regime. ... Antitrust remedies are thus not well-suited to address problems of 
market power in the electric power industry that result from existing high levels of 
concentration in generation." (DOE, 2000). 
  This suggests a further contrast on the two sides of the Atlantic, reflecting the 
prior histories of the electricity industry on the two continents. Deregulation in the 
United States was in principle a cautious relaxation of regulatory control over prices, 
with considerable awareness of the potential problems of market power. Electricity 
restructuring in Europe has tended to overlook issues of market power, and instead has 
concentrated on introducing wholesale and often retail markets in the expectation that 
they will be naturally competitive. The dictum of confining regulation to the natural 
monopolies has often been taken too literally, paying too little attention to the unnatural, 
or at least undesirable, monopolies in generation. These two histories should be borne in 
mind when examining consultants' recommendations for restructuring. It is worth asking 
whether they are sufficiently familiar with the richer and longer history of US regulation, 
or whether they are relying on standard competitive market doctrine of the kind normally 
written into competition law. The latter may be a weak reed on which to rely. 
 
5.  Conclusions on ESI restructuring 
 
The ESI is a highly capital-intensive industry, and its success depends critically upon the 
management of its investment programme. The main problem in most developing 
countries is that investment is poorly managed, poorly maintained, and often inadequate. 
These problems stem from an inability to finance investment from a sound cash flow, as 
well as poor incentives for efficient management and operation. Financial problems 
ultimately result from poor pricing decisions which can be seen as a reflection of 
inadequate regulation.  Public ownership is a form of regulation, though one that 
confuses the issue of protecting consumers, owners and other interests. There are good 
arguments for separating regulation from ownership. It is a central argument of this 
paper that regulation must be carefully designed to provide efficient incentives and 
adequate guarantees to sustain investment and operations. Separating ownership and 
regulation is best done by privatisation, but privatisation will only deliver efficiency and 
benefits to consumers if regulation is well designed.  
                                                 
     
13 Heartland 68 FERC at 62,066, cited as above.  
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  The logical sequence of events, some of which can happen simultaneously, is to 
first create the legislative and regulatory framework and institutions, and to restructure 
the state-owned ESI. Unbundling and corporatising the generation companies, national 
grid, and distribution companies while they are still in public ownership can precede the 
legislation and setting up the regulatory agencies, but privatisation cannot. Unbundling 
generation from transmission will require a restructuring of any contractual relationships 
between the two. A timetable for tariff rebalancing is needed before the distribution 
companies can be privatised, and the system of regulating transmission and distribution 
charges is critical to the success of the whole reform programme.  
  The argument for privatising distribution companies as soon as all the previous 
elements are in place, stable, and have developed an adequate track record for valuation, 
is that private ownership clarifies and stabilises the process of price determination, and 
provides incentives to ensure bills are collected, and financial viability restored. 
  Once this step has been taken or is confidently predicted, then generation can be 
opened to private investment. The simplest model, which may be the only viable one for 
smaller or less mature economies, is by creating a Single Buyer to offer long-term PPAs 
with IPPs by competitive tender. In some countries there may be enough spare capacity 
(once refurbished and made available) and sufficiently benign entry conditions, to 
privatise existing generation and move to a liberalised wholesale market, as in many 
Latin American countries. Here the main issue is one of restraining market power, 
through long-term contracts, and if institutional conditions are right, by retaining 
adequate powers to ensure wholesale prices are not "unjust and unreasonable". 
Developing investor confidence that intervening to control market power is not 
expropriative will be challenging in many countries, and other means of striking the 
right balance between the interests of investors and consumers may then be required, 
such as cost-based bidding. 
  In the best of cases, if regulation is credible and effective, and the 
macroeconomic conditions in the country are stable and supportive of private enterprise, 
then entry of and competition between new entrants should drive down generation costs 
which will be passed through the final consumers. Private ownership of distribution will 
reduce losses and address problems of non-payment, lowering the costs of serving those 
customers who do pay. Investors will be confident of earning a satisfactory return on 
their investment in the regulated sector, and will be willing to take commercial risks in 
the competitive sector. Supply competition forces prices to align with costs, eliminates 
cross-subsidies, and should clarify the value of reliability and quality of service. 
  Even in the most favourable cases, though, it is unlikely that full supply 
liberalisation  will be desirable. There are considerable advantages in retaining a 
franchise monopoly for smaller customers (up to 50-100kW, perhaps covering up to 
two-thirds of total demand).  The main advantages are that there will then by a viable 
counterparty for medium to long term contracts which assist entry and mitigate market 
power. There are additional advantages that, provided final tariffs are intelligently  
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regulated (for example by yardstick pricing of contracts), the costs of contracting are 
reduced without sacrificing the benefits of competition. In that case, supply competition 
will be more limited, and some cross-subsidies within the franchise market can be 
preserved. They may be politically necessary, though they may be less defensible. The 
case for further supply liberalisation should be based on a careful cost-benefit analysis of 
the advantages of (some) lower prices, reduced cross-subsidies and greater consumer-
orientation, compared to the extra costs. Given that it cost the best part of $1.5 billion to 
end the domestic franchise in Britain, these extra costs can easily destroy the case for 
complete supply liberalisation (Green and McDaniel, 1998). 
  In other countries less ambitious reforms of generation, based on the Single 
Buyer Model, may be sustainable with adequate reform in distribution, and with access 
to low cost indigenous fuel. In other countries the plausibility that private ownership of 
generation is viable or sustainable at lower cost than public ownership may be very 
doubtful, in which case reform of the continuing state-owned ESI to improve autonomy, 
accountability, and financial viability, may be the only option. The fact that such reforms 
have failed in the past does not make it wise to encourage irreversible reforms of 
unproven worth, and privatisation in unpropitious circumstances may be even more 
costly than the unsatisfactory status quo.  
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